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I. INTRODUCTION
Drawing upon the tragedy of the commons,i Francis
McGovern observed in 2002 that asbestos plaintiffs were
"arguably 'overgrazing' the accessible financial assets [recovery
from asbestos defendants] to the detriment of the total value of
those assets." 2 He warned defendants that they were "arguably
polluting their own economic environment" by litigating and
settling claims in a manner that encouraged plaintiffs' firms to
recruit more clients, which might ultimately overrun their
resources and the resources of their co-defendants.3 Judges, too,
' Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
2 Francis E. McGovern, The Tragedy of the Asbestos Commons, 88 VA. L.
REv. 1721, 1722 (2002).
3 1d. at 1722 & n.6, 1732.
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were "arguably challenging the legitimacy of the public justice
system by allowing" asbestos claims to dominate their dockets.4
He observed that the solution to the commons problem is typically
coercion,5 and that the "parties who cooperate first to orchestrate
[the] coercion [would be] the ones most likely to achieve their
[objectives].' 6
As judges and legislatures considered measures to reduce the
prevalence of the asymptomatic claims that dominated asbestos
litigation for more than a decade, 7 many prominent defendants
(with the assistance of key members of the asbestos plaintiffs' bar)
entered bankruptcy and subsequently emerged free of their long-
term asbestos liabilities during the last decade. These bankruptcy
cases, 9 in turn, resulted in a sharp increase in the number of
bankruptcy trusts established to pay current and future asbestos
victims. 1o As of today, roughly 100 companies have entered
bankruptcy to address their asbestos liabilities, and approximately
60 asbestos bankruptcy trusts have been established or are in the
process of being established."
4 Id. at 1722.
Id. at 1723.
6Id
7 See, e.g., Joseph W. Belluck et al., 7th Annual Judicial Symposium on
Civil Justice Issues: George Mason Judicial Education Program Transcript, The
Asbestos Litigation Tsunami-Will It Ever End?, 9 J. L. EcON. & POL'Y 489, 493-
95 (2013) [hereinafter Judicial Education Program Transcript]; Mark A.
Behrens, What's New in Asbestos Litigation?, 28 REV. LITIG. 501, 505 (2009);
Helen E. Freedman, Selected Ethical Issues in Asbestos Litigation, 37 Sw. U. L.
REV. 511, 513, 515 (2008).
8 Lee Blanton Ziffer, Bankruptcy Trusts and Asbestos Litigation, A.B.A.
(June I1, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litigation/committees/products/artic
les/spring2012-bankruptcy-trusts-asbestos-litigation.html#top; see also
Resolving Corporate Asbestos Liability, SHARON MERRILL, http://www.investor
relations.com/casestudies/13-asbestos-liability.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013)
(discussing how a small industrial manufacturer negotiated with "key members
of the plaintiffs bar" in an attempt "to permanently resolve its asbestos
liability").
9 See Judicial Education Program Transcript, supra note 7, at 493.
'
0 U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO- 11-819, ASBESTOS INJURY
COMPENSATION: THE ROLE AND ADMINISTRATION OF ASBESTOS TRUSTS 3, 14
(Sept. 2011) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
" Id. at 2-3.
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Yet, most of the trusts established to date have ultimately
suffered from the commons problem as well. 12 In adopting
settlement standards and payment practices that both "expand the
pool of compensable claims" and "front-load[] payments" to
current plaintiffs, 13 trusts are "arguably polluting their own
economic environment" by encouraging law firms to amass and
file more claims against them.14 Plaintiffs' firms rationally pursue
all ethically and legally appropriate means to increase the potential
recoveries for their clients,15 but, in doing so, they are arguably
overgrazing the trusts and solvent defendants. 16 Defendants
continue to establish bankruptcy trusts on terms that are favorable
to them,17 but, in so doing, they shift the risks that these trusts are
12 McGovern, supra note 2, at 1747-50.
13 S. Todd Brown, How Long is Forever This Time? The Broken Promise
of Bankruptcy Trusts, 61 BUFF. L. REV. 537, 539 n.12, 550-51, 559 (2013)
[hereinafter Brown, Forever] (explaining that the negotiations that lead to the
establishment of bankruptcy trusts and the voting requirements under section
524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code result in standards that both expand the number
of compensable claims and maximize the settlement values for strong claims).
14 See McGovern, supra note 2, at 1722.
15 See generally Freedman, supra note 7, at 519-21 (discussing ethics in
asbestos settlements).
16 McGovern, supra note 2, at 1722.
7 This occurs in both consensual and contested bankruptcy cases. In
consensual cases, the debtor and leading members of the plaintiffs' bar reach
mutually agreeable terms prior to the commencement of the case, and these
settlements typically allow the debtor to retain considerable assets and equity to
retain some or all of its interest in the debtor. Mark D. Plevin et al., Pre-
Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: A Flawed Solution, 44 S. TEX. L. REV. 883,
884, 888, 891 (2003). Under this model, Halliburton, which was not expected to
be at any serious risk of insolvency, used the bankruptcy process to cap its long-
term asbestos liabilities and effectively transfer any risk of trust underfunding to
future victims. See Mark D. Plevin et al., The Future Claims Representative in
Prepackaged Asbestos Bankruptcies: Conflicts of Interest, Strange Alliances,
and Unfamiliar Duties for Burdened Bankruptcy Courts, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV.
AM. L. 271, 297 n.1 16 (2006); Ronald Barliant et al., From Free-Fall to Free-
For-All: The Rise of Pre-Packaged Asbestos Bankruptcies, 12 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REV. 441, 451-52 (2004); see also Judicial Education Program
Transcript, supra note 7, at 498 (noting that plaintiffs' attorney Charles Siegel
stated that Halliburton "is not, and never has been ... bankrupt in any sense that
is familiar," but nonetheless was able to "deal with its asbestos liabilities" in
bankruptcy). Conversely, in challenging plaintiffs' claims extensively in its
bankruptcy case, W.R. Grace ultimately attained a favorable settlement with
302 [Vol. 23
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underfunded to future victims and solvent defendants in the tort
system. 18 Additionally, the courts overseeing these cases are
arguably challenging the legitimacy of the bankruptcy process by
confirming reorganization plans that perpetuate long recognized
weaknesses in each successive trust. 19 Instead of moving asbestos
compensation toward a sustainable equilibrium, bankruptcy trusts
have arguably both accelerated their own demise and fueled the
broader commons problem in the tort system. 20
This article examines the bankruptcy trust system as part of
the overall framework for asbestos personal injury compensation.
Part I provides a basic background concerning the linkages across
solvent and bankrupt defendants, how bankruptcy trusts are
established and operate, and the growing significance of trust
operations and payments in the tort system. Parts II and III compile
the most common arguments concerning proposed transparency
legislation addressing the trusts at the state and federal level,
respectively, and analyze their relative strengths and weaknesses.
Part IV breaks away from these traditional arguments, suggesting
that they largely miss the broader long-term implications of the
current system for victim compensation.
plaintiffs concerning its trust contribution requirements. Some Asbestos Grace,
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 8, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/article/SB120494308054321
521.html#printMode (discussing the W.R. Grace bankruptcy settlement); see S.
Todd Brown, Section 524(g) Without Compromise: Voting Rights and the
Asbestos Bankruptcy Paradox, 2008 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 841, 921 & n.209
(2008) [hereinafter Brown, Without Compromise] (noting the company's
strategy of challenging individual claims); Lester Brickman, The Use of
Litigation Screenings in Mass Torts: A Formula for Fraud?, 61 SMU L. REV.
1221, 1339-40 n.636 (2008) (discussing the expert report in the Grace
bankruptcy, and suggesting that the number of asbestos claims filed is "fourteen
times greater than the number of medically plausible cases of asbestosis").
18 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 538-39.
19 See id. at 582-83 (arguing that the experience of the trusts to date
suggests that the continued approval of similar trusts without demanding
substantial changes is inconsistent with the Bankruptcy Code and its underlying
policies).20 Id. at 538-39.
2013] 303
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II. BACKGROUND: ASBESTOS LITIGATION, TRUSTS, AND LINKAGES
The prevailing narrative 21 concerning the origins of the
asbestos personal injury crisis remains largely as it has been for the
last three decades.22 Asbestos was prized for its resistance to heat,
acid, alkalis, and electricity throughout much of the last century. 23
It was designated a "critical war material" during World War II and
was integrated into thousands of products.24 For much of this time,
key members of the asbestos industry, medical establishment,
government, and others were aware of a growing body of evidence
suggesting a correlation between exposure to airborne asbestos and
pneumoconiosis and certain forms of cancer, including malignant
mesothelioma.25 Although the industry successfully manipulated
public opinion concerning these risks until the 1960s, 26 the
industry was flooded with personal injury claims once these risks
became common knowledge and plaintiffs increasingly obtained
favorable verdicts at trial.27
As asbestos claims mounted during the late 1970s and early
1980s, a relatively small group of defendants shouldered the
2 Although this narrative has gained the most traction, it has been
challenged as plagued by hindsight bias and "retroactive inculpation for acts
committed decades earlier that were not wrongful at the time." LESTER
BRICKMAN, LAWYER BARONS: WHAT THEIR CONTINGENCY FEES REALLY COST
AMERICA 153 (2011); see also Rachel Maines, The Asbestos Litigation Master
Narrative: Building Codes, Engineering Standards, and "Retroactive
Inculpation", 13 ENTERPRISE & SOC'Y 862, 864 (2012) (agreeing with Brickman
and further suggesting that asbestos was required in many products in which
there was no "equivalent-performance substitute").
22 Maines, supra note 21, at 862-63.
23 Id. at 864.
24 ANDREW SCHNEIDER & DAVID MCCUMBER, AN AIR THAT KILLS: How
THE ASBESTOS POISONING OF LIBBY, MONTANA, UNCOVERED A NATIONAL
SCANDAL 81-82 (2004).
25 See Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 844-45; see also
Pneumoconiosis, HARV. HEALTH PUBLICATIONS, http://www.drugs.com/health-
guide/pneumoconiosis.html (last visited Oct. 8, 2013).
26 Elihu Inselbuch et al., The Effrontery of the Asbestos Trust Transparency
Legislation Efforts, 28:2 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP. ASBESTOS 3 (Feb. 20, 2013),
available at www.capdale.com/files/8122_ASBO22013cm.pdf.
27 Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 846.
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largest liability shares. 28 The defendants in this first tier were most
often targeted because of their central roles in the asbestos
industry, the growing availability of evidence tying them to
intentional concealment of the dangers of asbestos, the extensive
work performed by plaintiffs' firms to establish exposure to these
defendants' products, and, for some, the perceived ability to satisfy
judgments at trial.29 By contrast, other defendants were named less
frequently because plaintiffs' attorneys had not yet developed the
evidence linking them to their clients' injuries or to actual
knowledge of the dangers of asbestos, which tended to make for
less compelling narratives at trial and in settlement discussions.3 0
The bankruptcies of these early lead defendants triggered,31
and each successive wave of bankruptcies continued, an "endless
search for a solvent bystander" that continues today. 32 After some
28 Id. at 852; see also Jeff Dircksen, Gordian Knot: How the Senate's
Asbestos "Reform" Bill Entangles Taxpayers, NTU Policy Paper No. 118, NAT'L
TAXPAYERS UNION (Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.ntu.org/news-and-issues/econ
omy/how-senate-asbestos-reform-bill-entangles-taxpayers.html.
29 See generally H.R. REP. No. 12-687, at 3-5, 34-35 (2012), available at
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/CRPT- 112hrpt687/html/CRPT- 112hrpt687.htm
[hereinafter FACT ACT REPORT] (discussing asbestos litigation, fraud, and the
need for legislation). For example, Johns-Manville, which was the second
asbestos defendant to enter bankruptcy in 1982, "was, by most accounts, the
largest supplier of raw asbestos and manufacturer of asbestos-containing
products in the United States." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137,
140 (2009).
30 See generally FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 4, 7 (discussing "the
mass filing of lawsuits by plaintiffs ... without reliable proof of causation").
31 'Medical Monitoring and Asbestos Litigation' -A Discussion with
Richard Scruggs and Victor Schwartz, 17:1 MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 1,
5 (Mar. 1, 2002) [hereinafter MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS]; Travelers
Indem. Co., 557 U.S. at 140 (noting that "the prospect of overwhelming liability
led Manville to file for bankruptcy protection").
32 See MEALEY'S LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS, supra note 31, at 5. Most
recently, this "endless search" has extended beyond products manufactured with
asbestos parts to products that were merely compatible with asbestos-containing
components produced by others. Compare Lindstrom v. A-C Prod. Liab. Trust,
424 F.3d 488, 497-98 (6th Cir. 2005) (no duty to warn of potential exposure to
asbestos in others' products), and O'Neil v. Crane Co., 266 P.3d 987, 1005 (Cal.
2012) (rejecting appeal to extend strict liability to include such claims), and
Simonetta v. Viad Corp., 197 P.3d 127, 133, 138 (Wash. 2008) (asserting that a
manufacturer of an evaporator "sans asbestos insulation," finding "little to no
2013] 305
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of these first-tier defendants commenced bankruptcy, plaintiffs
could still seek full recovery from other defendants.33 Unable to
shoulder the additional burden, many of these second-tier
defendants also commenced bankruptcy; thereby, shifting the
liability shares they carried to still other defendants.34 Defendants
who were once viewed as tertiary have increasingly become lead
defendants in the tort system, and many of these defendants have
also entered bankruptcy in recent years. 35 And, as Justice Kennedy
observed in 2003, "[w]ith each bankruptcy the remaining
defendants come under greater financial strain, . . . and the funds
available for compensation become closer to exhaustion." 36
support under our case law for extending the duty to warn to another
manufacturer's product" and, accordingly, concluding that the defendant "cannot
be held responsible for the asbestos contained in another manufacturer's
product"), with In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 36 Misc. 3d 1234(A), 4, 6, 16
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012) (concluding that a manufacturer has a duty to warn where
it had or should have had knowledge of the use of asbestos-containing
components produced by others in connection with its product).
3 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 545-46.
34 Philip Bentley & David Blabey Jr., Asbestos Estimation in Today's
Bankruptcies: The Central Importance of the New Trusts, 26:24 MEALEY'S
LITIG. REP. ASBESTOs 2, 6 (2012).
In the first four years of the 21st century, at least 36 companies filed
for bankruptcy to address their asbestos liabilities. These companies-
mostly construction companies and their suppliers-included such
major asbestos defendants as Armstrong World Industries, Federal-
Mogul Corporation, Kaiser Aluminum, Owens Corning, U.S.
Gypsum Company, and W.R. Grace. This bankruptcy wave had a
profound effect on the asbestos defendants that remained in the tort
system, which had, to this point, been only peripheral defendants.
Id
3 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 545-46 (discussing the profile of
companies that have recently filed for bankruptcy); see also Conner v. Alfa
Laval, Inc., 842 F. Supp. 2d 791, 793 n.2. (E.D. Pa. 2012) ("[A]s asbestos
litigation has evolved, and the major manufacturing defendants have declared
bankruptcy, the litigation has moved away from the manufacturers of asbestos,
and defendants in the cases now pending before this Court are typically those
that manufactured so-called 'bare-metal' products that contained or were later
encapsulated in asbestos."); supra note 34 and accompanying text.
36 Norfolk & W. Ry. v. Ayers, 538 U.S. 135, 169 (2003) (Kennedy, J.,
dissenting); see also Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 598 (1997)
(" '[E]xhaustion of assets threatens and distorts the process; and future claimants
306 [Vol. 23
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Although the profile of asbestos claims changed in the last
decade, 37 we remain in the midst of a slow-motion, cascading
failure that continues to stretch deeper into the pool of potential
defendants.38 Some of this strain may be the lingering effect of the
asymptomatic claims that dominated asbestos litigation for more
than a decade, 39 but solvent defendants also point to lingering
distortions in the system that, they claim, continue to impose
irrationally elevated liability shares upon them.40 In order to more
fully evaluate these claims and the proposals that have been
advanced to address them, this section outlines how exposure and
compensation linkages in the tort system may fuel this pattern,
examines the manner in which bankruptcy trusts replace tort
defendants in the compensation scheme, and discusses the degree
to which trust claim and payment information may offset linkages
across bankrupt and solvent defendants in the tort system.4 1
A. Linkages that Increase Solvent Defendant Liability Shares
The linkages 42 that make the transfer of liability shares from
bankrupt defendants to solvent defendants possible are at the heart
of the asbestos bankruptcy cycle.43 These linkages are not unique
to asbestos litigation, but the extent to which they have extended
liability is unprecedented due to the number of victims exposed to
may lose altogether.' ") (quoting REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE AD HOC
COMMITTEE ON ASBESTOS LITIGATION 2-3 (Mar. 1991)).
3 Behrens, supra note 7, at 523-24.
38 See id. at 527, 556-57.
39 See supra note 7.
40 See Laura Kingsley Hong & Robert E. Haffke, Apportioning Liability in
Asbestos Litigation: A Review of the Law in Key Jurisdictions, 26 T.M. COOLEY
L. REV. 681, 682, 684, 690 (2009).
41 See infra Part L.A-C.
42 The linkages concept has been used to capture the various connections
across defendants and between the bankruptcy trust and tort systems previously.
See LLOYD DIXON & GEOFFREY MCGOVERN, ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
AND TORT COMPENSATION xii (2011), available at http://www.rand.org/content/
dam/rand/pubs/monographs/201 1/RAND MG1104.sum.pdf. Although I have
adopted a slightly different approach and labels, the underlying reference to
these connections and their cross-forum and cross-party consequences captures
largely the same principles.
43 d
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asbestos and the number of companies that have played a role in
the production, distribution, and use of asbestos-containing
products.44
1. Exposure Linkages: Overlapping Exposures, Causation,
and Liability
Exposure linkages shift liability where plaintiffs were exposed
to bankrupt and solvent defendants' products, but only exposures to
solvent defendants' products are considered in determining
causation and allocation of liability.45 These linkages may drive the
cycle because: (1) workers and customers may have been exposed
to a wide variety of asbestos products; (2) it is not possible to state
with certainty that any specific exposure or combination of
exposures caused a specific injury; and (3) the narratives that
influence alternative causation defenses and probabilistic
allocations of several liability in the tort system undergo
fundamental shifts once former lead defendants exit the tort
system.46
For any one plaintiff, the universe of potentially responsible
defendants is limited by the plaintiffs exposure history. 47
Insulation workers, for example, may have worked with a range of
products manufactured and sold by dozens of defendants over
48several decades. Someone who replaced gaskets in industrial
products may have been exposed to asbestos gaskets produced by
multiple companies over time, but given that many of the products
that used these gaskets also contained asbestos insulation or other
products, this same worker may also assert claims against the
44 See Francis E. McGovern, An Analysis of Mass Torts for Judges, 73
TEX. L. REv. 1821, 1827, 1831-34 (1995) (discussing the high elasticity among
plaintiffs and defendants in asbestos litigation).
45 See DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xii, xv.
46 See FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 3-5, 7; see also Hong &
Haffke, supra note 40, at 717-20 (discussing various defenses used by
defendants).
47 See DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at xvi.
48 Asbestos Insulation, ASBESTOS.COM, http://www.asbestos.com/products/
construction/insulation.php (last visited Oct. 22, 2013).
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manufacturers of these other products.49 Some plaintiffs worked at
multiple job sites and in different jobs over the course of their
careers, so they may claim workplace exposures to asbestos
products that may be tied to each worksite or job type.5 0 Moreover,
some victims may assert "take-home" or "do-it-yourself' exposure
instead of, or in addition to, workplace exposure.5'
Given the limits of our scientific knowledge in this area,52 and
the likelihood that any given plaintiff was exposed to asbestos
produced, sold, or used by numerous defendants, allocation of fault
is ultimately a probabilistic inquiry. 53 Fault is allocated across
defendants based on a variety of factors that are known to increase
the risk of developing the applicable cancer or other disease: extent
and duration of exposure, type of asbestos used in the product, the
extent to which the asbestos was friable, and so on. 54 Similarly, in
some states, this evidence may be sufficient to allow some co-
defendants to prove alternative causation. 5 To that end, known
defendants are listed on verdict forms with juries left to allocate
responsibility to them based on rough assessments of these and
other factors.5 6
Thus, in advancing the evidence necessary to establish specific
causation with respect to lead defendants-acknowledging
exposure to their products and putting forward witnesses who
attested to personal knowledge of the plaintiffs presence when
those products were used-plaintiffs also provide other defendants
49 DIXoN & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 3; see also In re Garlock Sealing
Techs., Inc., Case No. 10-31607, at 14-16 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2014)
(describing asbestos gaskets, their use, and the process for replacing them and
noting that "[v]irtually all of the pipes, flanges and valves where Garlock's
gaskets were used were wrapped in a thick covering of thermal insulation
produced by other manufacturers").
5o DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 3.
51 Mesothelioma Prevention, ASBESTOS.COM, www.asbestos.com/mesothe
lioma/prevention.php (last visited Sept. 21, 2013).
52 Jane Stapleton, The Two Explosive Proof-of-Causation Doctrines
Central to Asbestos Claims, 74 BROOK. L. REv. 1011, 1025 (2009).
5 See id. at 1029.
54 DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 16, 73-74.
51d. at 14, 17.56 Id. at 14.
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with a natural check on the expansion of their own liabilities.57
These tertiary defendants can point to testimony that emphasizes
use of the lead defendants' products to obtain only marginal fault
allocations at trial or, depending on the state law at issue, prevail
on causation or other issues altogether. 5 Thus, it is perhaps
unsurprising that many of today's lead defendants enjoyed years or
decades of success in the tort system, having the cases against
them dismissed or settled at amounts well below their projected
transaction costs in all but a handful of cases. 59
Solvent defendants contend that this process is distorted today
because plaintiffs, directly or through their witnesses, deny
exposure to bankrupt defendants' products solely to preclude their
consideration at trial or in settlement. 60 Although the available
evidence may suggest that bankrupt defendants' products were
present in a given workplace, solvent defendants must still
demonstrate that the plaintiff worked with or was otherwise
exposed to airborne asbestos from these products. 6 1 The witnesses
5 1 Id. at 16.
58 Hong & Haffke, supra note 40, at 688-91.
59 THOMAS E. WILLGING, TRENDS IN ASBESTOS LITIGATION 25 (Federal
Judicial Center 1987), available at www.fjc.gov/public/pdf.nsf/lookup/asbststr.
pdf/$file/asbststr.pdf; see also Michelle J. White, Is Asbestos the Future of Mass
Torts?, DEPARTMENT ECON., U. CAL., SAN DIEGO, Nov. 2003, at 17, available
at http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=1 0.1.1.194.9079&rep=rep
1&type=pdf.
60 DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 16-17. As Judge Hodges
recently observed:
Most significant to Garlock, though, was the fact that often the evidence of
exposure to those [bankrupt] insulation companies' products also
"disappeared." This occurrence was a result of the effort by some plaintiffs
and their lawyers to withhold evidence of exposure to other asbestos
products and to delay filing claims against bankrupt defendants' asbestos
trusts until after obtaining recoveries from Garlock (and other viable
defendants).
In re Garlock Sealing Techs., Inc., Case No. 10-31607, at 30 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
Jan. 10, 2014).
61 See, e.g., Threadgill v. Manville Corp. Asbestos Disease Comp. Fund,
1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 19083, at *8-9 (D. Del. July 27, 1990) (holding that
purely circumstantial evidence of product nexus was insufficient; the evidence
must show that the plaintiff was in proximity to the product when it was being
used to establish causation).
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who are most likely to present admissible testimony concerning
such exposures will be the plaintiff, former co-workers, or relatives,
though most will have little recollection of which products were
used decades ago prior to meeting with counsel.62 To overcome
these gaps in memory, defendants contend that witnesses may be
coached to recall solvent defendants' products and disavow any
recollection of the plaintiffs exposure to bankrupt defendants'
products. 63 Moreover, witnesses who once testified to the
prevalence of bankrupt defendants' products in the relevant
workplace may no longer be available, and it is perhaps
unsurprising if these witnesses qualify those recollections by
denying that this plaintiff was exposed to those products where
they perceive that doing so will help their co-workers, friends, and
family members. 64
2. Compensation Linkages: The Role of Joint Liability
Compensation linkages arise where joint liability rules transfer
the unpaid liability shares of bankrupt defendants to one or more
solvent co-defendants. 65 Whereas exposure linkages shift liability
by the omission of exposures to bankrupt defendants' products,
compensation linkages arise in joint liability jurisdictions merely
62 See, e.g., Lester Brickman, On the Theory Class's Theories of Asbestos
Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV.
33, 139-41 (2003).
63 See, e.g., id. at 139-40, 142-45. Although the discussion of these
practices has centered on professionalism questions, see, e.g., W. William
Hodes, The Professional Duty to Horseshed Witnesses-Zealously, Within the
Bounds of the Law, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1343, 1362-63 (1999) ("Given the
fragility of human perception, memory, and communication, a wide range of
discrepant statements about the same event can all be true, or at least not false.
Thus, there may be considerable ethical leeway to coach witnesses to adopt one,
rather than another, version of events."), they also raise considerable policy
concerns about the ultimate truth-seeking capacity of civil litigation.
64 See generally Charles Silver, Preliminary Thoughts on the Economics of
Witness Preparation, 30 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1383, 1384-86 (1999) (discussing
the role of laypersons coaching witnesses generally, and in the asbestos context
specifically, and suggesting that it is ultimately far more prevalent than witness
coaching by lawyers).65 DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xv.
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as a matter of policy.66 In pure joint liability jurisdictions, even
defendants who have modest several liabilities due to their limited
roles in contributing to a plaintiffs injury may be required to carry
all unsatisfied bankrupt defendants' liability shares. 67 In
jurisdictions where only defendants who have contributed more
than a certain amount to the plaintiffs injury will be held jointly
liable, exposure linkages may unduly elevate the defendant's
perceived contribution above this threshold, ensuring that even
peripheral defendants may be held jointly liable. 68 In either case,
solvent defendants contend that the sheer number of co-defendant
bankruptcies to date and their respective roles in the asbestos
industry have the potential to increase solvent defendants' liability
shares dramatically. 69
B. The Potential Offsetting Effect of Bankruptcy Materials and
Payments
Although a defendant's bankruptcy may have once ensured
that any tort plaintiff would receive little or no recovery,70 this is
not the case in modem asbestos bankruptcies. 71 As noted
previously, several formerly prominent defendants in asbestos
litigation have established bankruptcy trusts, which control several
billion dollars in assets for the benefit of current and future
victims. 72 These trusts, most of which have been established under
section 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code,73 will pay claims only after
determining that the plaintiff has produced evidence sufficient to
demonstrate exposure to the applicable trust's predecessor's
66 Id. at 65-66.
67 Steven B. Hantler et al., Moving Toward the Fully Informed Jury, 3 GEO.
J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 21, 41 (2005).
68 See, e.g., Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 8.
69 Behrens, supra note 7, at 542.
7o S. Todd Brown, Constitutional Gaps in Bankruptcy, 20 AM. BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 179, 187 n.37 (2012) (discussing historical treatment of tort claims
in bankruptcy proceedings).
7' See Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 852.
72 See supra notes 7-11 and accompanying text; see also DIXON &
McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 2-3.
7 See DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 2.
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products. 74 Thus, solvent defendants believe that mandatory
disclosure of these representations will offset the impact of
exposure linkages in the tort system, and disclosure of the amounts
received from trusts will likewise offset the impact of
compensation linkages by demonstrating that at least some of the
bankruptcy shares have been paid.75
1. Information Advanced During an Asbestos Bankruptcy
Consistent with chapter I1's focus on the direct relationships
among the debtor and its creditors, section 524(g) was enacted to
address the debtor's, creditors', and future victims' interests-
ensuring equal protection of present and future claimants' rights
against the debtor, preservation of the going-concern value of the
debtor for the benefit of all creditors and future victims, and
providing prompt payment of meritorious claimS76-not the impact
of the proceedings on non-parties, including co-defendants.7 7 Thus,
section 524(g) provides the debtor with a means of channeling all
of its current and future asbestos liability to a trust established to
pay current and future claims. 78 To protect asbestos victims,
current and future, this provision outlines several conditions that
must be satisfied prior to the entry of the injunction including: (1)
the appointment of a representative to speak for future victims in
the proceedings;7 9 (2) assurances that the trust will value and pay
current and future victims in substantially the same manner;80 (3) a
judicial finding that the channeling injunction is fair and equitable
in light of the protected parties' contributions to the trust; ' and (4)
74 See infra Part II.B.2.
75DIXoN & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xii, xv, 19, 35-36 (explaining
the link between trusts and bankruptcies).
76 In re Plant Insulation Co., 469 B.R. 843, 859-61 (Bankr. N.D. Cal. 2012)
("Congress had three purposes in enacting section 524(g): equal treatment of
present and future asbestos claimants; preservation of going-concern value; and
prompt payment of meritorious asbestos claims.").
n Id. at 859.
8Id. at 860.
79 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)(4)(B)(i) (2013).
80 § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(V).
" § 524(g)(4)(B)(ii).
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the approval of the plan by no less than seventy-five percent of
known asbestos plaintiffs with current claims against the estate. 82
In the typical chapter 11, the right to participate as a creditor
involves a series of factual admissions and disclosures. 83 Most
creditors are required to file a proof of claim, which outlines the
factual and legal basis for the claim. 84 If a claim was liquidated
pre-petition, the amount of this settlement may also be disclosed
on the debtor's official schedules of assets and liabilities.8 5 If a
claim is settled during the course of a case, the debtor will most
often be required to file a motion seeking approval of the
settlement, which will include the legal and factual basis of the
claim and the amount of the settlement.8 6
Transparency may be the norm in most chapter 11 cases, but
these rules rarely apply in asbestos cases.87 If a plaintiffs claim is
referenced in public documents, it is likely to be indirect; the only
information disclosed will be the name, address, and type of claims
asserted by the law firm, without any specific reference to the
identity of the plaintiff.88 Asbestos claimants are not required to
file a proof of claim, and other mandatory disclosures under the
bankruptcy rules have been modified by courts to preclude public
disclosure of the identities of asbestos claimants participating in a
case. 89 Rather, such submissions, discovery, and any other
pleadings or materials that include identifying information will be
shielded by protective orders during and after the bankruptcy
case.90 In sum, a plaintiff may assert a right to payment against the
82 § 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb).
8 § 501.
84 § 501(a).
85 § 521(a)(6); Norman L. Tolle, Bankrupt Claimants May Be Barred From
Pursuing Disability Benefits, RIVKIN RADLER (April 2005), http://www.rivkin
radler.com/publications.cfm?id=547.
86 In re Blake, 452 B.R. 1, 11 (Bankr. D. Mass. 2011) (noting that
"settlements generally are subject to disclosure and bankruptcy court approval
procedures under both the federal and local bankruptcy rules").
87 Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 920-21.
8 Id. at 866-67.
89 Id.
90 See generally In re Motions for Access of Garlock Sealing Techs.,
L.L.C., 488 B.R. 281, 302 (D. Del. 2013) (discussing Garlock's limitations to
access certain exhibits); T.K. Kim, Federal Judge Closes Portion of Garlock
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bankruptcy estate, vote on any proposed plan, and otherwise enjoy
the full array of protections enjoyed by any other creditor in the
case without the public disclosure of her identity or the factual
basis for her claim. 9 1
The most obvious explanation for the distinct treatment of
asbestos claims in bankruptcy is that transparency is intended to
enable parties in interest to protect their interests in the bankruptcy
case.92 Bankruptcy law does not seek to provide co-defendants
with information they may use to defend themselves in tort
litigation. 93 Rather, to the extent courts consider co-defendant
access at all, they understandably assume that these rights are
governed by state discovery rules, and any right to obtain the
information that forms the basis of the plaintiffs' claims or
concerning payments they receive from a bankrupt defendant or
trust will be addressed in state court. 94
2. Bankruptcy Trust Submissions and Payments
Much like a debtor-in-possession in bankruptcy, the trusts
have independent management, seek to preserve and grow the
limited funds under their control for the benefit of creditors, and
file financial reports with the bankruptcy court. 95 Trust
management-one or more trustees, a legal representative for
future victims (FCR or future claimants' representative), a trust
advisory committee (TAC) comprised of leading plaintiffs'
lawyers, and private claim reviewers-varies from one trust to the
next, but most of these parties are repeat players with appointments
Bankruptcy Trial, LEGAL NEWSLINE (July 26, 2013), http://legalnewsline.com/
issues/asbestos/243134-federal-judge-closes-portion-of-garlock-bankruptcy-trial
(discussing the bankruptcy court's decision to seal estimation hearing testimony
concerning asbestos claim fraud allegations).
91 Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 856-57.
92 Id. at 919-20; Kim, supra note 90.
93 See DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 29-30.
94 See infra Part I.B.2.c.
9 How Bankruptcy and Settlement Trusts Affect Asbestos Lawsuits,
ASBESTOs NETWORK, www.asbestosnetwork.com/tools/tl bankruptcy.htm (last
visited Oct. 14, 2013).
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at multiple trusts. 96 Likewise, the procedures governing their
operations remain similar across most trusts.9 7
For the purposes of this discussion, the key components of
these operations are the manner in which they review claims, how
claims are valued and paid once approved, and the public and
private avenues for obtaining access to this information. 98 Each
component is discussed in turn below.
a. Claim Review
Unlike debtors in possession, private claim reviewers hired by
the trusts process and review claims to determine whether
claimants ultimately qualify to become trust beneficiaries, and
bankruptcy courts do not supervise this process. 99 Rather, this
component of trust administration is governed by trust distribution
procedures (TDPs), which outline the process for filing claims,
how the claims will be reviewed, and mechanisms for contesting
unfavorable claim determinations. 100 These procedures also
outline: (1) distinct categories of claims according to the injury
asserted; (2) the criteria for obtaining compensation for each
category of claim; (3) the scheduled value for each category of
injury; and (4) one or more mechanisms for plaintiffs to obtain
more than the scheduled value for their claims following a more
extensive individual review.10'
The criteria employed to evaluate claims for payment
ostensibly mirror those used in the tort system-focusing on
whether the plaintiff has the asserted injury and has established
evidence sufficient to demonstrate exposure to the trust
predecessors' conduct-and vary according to the asserted injury,
but the actual standards may be far lower than required in the
96 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 552.
97 See In re Fed.-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2012).
98 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 552-53; DIXON & McGOVERN, supra
note 42, at 13.
99 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 552; GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at
13.
100 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 552-53 (discussing how
individual claims are reviewed).
o' See id at 554-55.
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applicable state court. 102 The veracity of some medical reports
advanced by the plaintiffs' expert may not be challenged by claim
reviewers, and other potential causes for a plaintiffs' asserted
injuries (smoking, for example) may not be considered if the
claimant is not forthcoming with such information.103 Moreover,
exposure may be established by demonstrating that the claimant
worked at an approved worksite and by providing an affidavit from
the claimant, a co-worker, or a family member attesting to
exposure to a qualifying product or someone who worked with a
qualifying product. 104 Limitations periods are likewise more
generous in the bankruptcy trust system than in the tort system.'05
Moreover, claims based on fiber migration theories may be
compensable by the trusts 106 even though state courts have
consistently rejected such claims.107 Thus, it is possible that some
claims may be approved even if the evidence supporting exposure
may not survive early dispositive motions in the relevant state
court. 108
In practice, a claimant seeking compensation from a trust must
file a claim form, which, among other things, requires a statement
of injury; information sufficient to establish asbestos exposure
attributable to the trust's predecessor under the TDP under penalty
of perjury; and a determination as to whether the claimant is
102 Id. at 554, 565.
103 Id. at 567; see also Marc C. Scarcella et al., Asbestos Litigation,
Attorney Advertising & Bankruptcy Trusts: The Economic Incentives Behind the
New Recruitment of Lung Cancer Claims, 13:4 MEALEY'S ASBESTOS BANKR.
REP. 7 (Nov. 2013) (arguing that trusts do not require disclosure of smoking
history for lung cancer claims).
104 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 562-63, 570.
1o See, e.g., Bruszewski v. Motley Rice, L.L.C., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
181187, at *17 (E.D. Ky. Dec. 21, 2012) (defending malpractice action against
law firm for failing to file before state limitations period ran by arguing, among
other things, that the damages periods do not preclude submitting claims to
bankruptcy trusts).
106 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 561-62.
107 American Bar Ass'n, Transcript, Task Force on Asbestos Litigation and
the Bankruptcy Trusts, at 131 (June 6, 2013), available at http://www.american
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/tips/asbestos tf/revised task force on_
asbestoslitigation andthebankruptcytrusts_06-06-2013.authcheckdam.pdf
[hereinafter ABA June 6 Transcript].
108 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 566.
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seeking expedited or individual review. 109 If the file is incomplete
or the evidence is otherwise deemed insufficient, the trust will
notify the submitting law firm of the deficiencies and provide the
firm one or more opportunities to correct them.1 0 At this stage, the
submitting firm will either attempt to correct the deficiencies until
the claim is approved or may ultimately withdraw the claim."'
Once a claim reviewer approves and assigns a settlement value to a
claim, the trust will make an offer to the claimant.112
b. Payments From Bankruptcy Trusts
Although the "settlement value" reflects the value assigned to
a claim, any payment to the claimant may be reduced or suspended
due to one or more other provisions of the TDP. 113 First,
bankruptcy trusts adopt payment percentages where their projected
current and future payments exceed their projected assets in an
effort to preserve assets for future victims, and substantially all of
the active and proposed trusts have payment percentages of less
than 100%.114 Thus, a claim that is settled for $100,000 by a trust
with a 10% payment percentage will result in a payment of just
$10,000 ($100,000 x 0.1)." Several trusts further control costs by
adopting annual payment caps, beyond which all new approved
claims must wait for payment until the subsequent year, and a
claims payment ratio, which limits payments to certain categories
of claims in a given year to a certain percentage of the aggregate
payments made during the year.116
109 Id. at 552-55.
110 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 19, 21.
1 Id.
112 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 555.
113 Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts: A
2013 Overview of Trust Assets, Compensation & Governance, 12:11 MEALEY'S
ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 3 (June 2013); Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 555.
114 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 574-76.
115 See generally id at 576 (demonstrating the mathematical
determinations involved in settlement payment percentages).
116 For example, the Combustion Engineering 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust
employs a Maximum Annual Payment (or MAP, currently set at $75 million)
and a Claims Payment Ratio, which allocates 87% ($65,250,000) of the MAP to
malignancy claims and 13% ($9,750,000) to non-malignant claims. See
Combustion Engineering 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust 2013 Maximum Annual
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Notwithstanding the payment percentage reductions, active
trusts paid $15 billion to claimants from 2006 through 2012."' Of
this amount, between $2.6 and $3.5 billion was paid to settle non-
malignant claims, and roughly 80% of the amount paid to
malignancy and severe asbestosis claimants went to mesothelioma
victims.118 Given the size of these payments, some projections
previously suggested that the trust system would soon provide
victims with all or substantially all of their compensation." 9 And
given the relatively small number of active mesothelioma claims
during this time frame,120 solvent defendants may have reasonably
believed that their liability shares for such claims would decline
dramatically once the trusts established in the last decade started
paying claims.' 2 1
What, then, explains the disconnect between the aggregate
payment patterns at established trusts and plaintiffs' firms'
arguments that they receive, on average, only a small fraction of
the value of their claims from bankruptcy trusts? 22
Payment, Claims Payment Ratio, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 524(g) ASBESTOS
PI TRUST, http://www.cetrust.org/docs/CE 2013 MAPNotice.pdf. (last visited
Oct. 19, 2013). The trust's non-malignancy MAP for 2013 was exhausted in
January of this year. Id. The trust paid all approved malignancy claims in 2012-
$89,282,678, an amount that exceeds the malignancy portion of the MAP by
more than $34 million (or 36.8%)-due to a "carryover" from years earlier.
Annual Report, Financial Statements and Results of Operations of the
Combustion Engineering 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust for the Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2011, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 524(g) ASBESTOS PI TRUST at
4 (Apr. 30, 2012), http://www.cetrust.org/docs/CEAnnual Report 201 1.pdf
[hereinafter Combustion Annual Report 2011].
117 Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 113, at 3.
"
8 Id. at 7.
1l9 See Charles E. Bates et al., The Naming Game, 24:15 MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP. ASBESTOS 6 (Sept. 2, 2009).
120 ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 139.
121 See DIXoN & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 13-14 (discussing how
defendants look to liability standards when planning trial strategy).
122 Judicial Education Program Transcript, supra note 7, at 511-12
(walking through the amounts an attorney's clients stand to receive from
bankruptcy trusts according to scheduled values and payment percentages, and
stating that they average roughly $300,000 in total trust payments). By contrast,
the court overseeing the Garlock bankruptcy recently observed that actual trust
recoveries for a representative sample of plaintiffs who responded to
information questionnaires averaged "about $600,000 from 22 Trusts." In
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First, the figures used to identify payments that may be
received from the trusts typically assume scheduled values,l2 3 not
the substantially higher payments available if plaintiffs pursue
individual review.124 For example, under the Lummus TDP, the
scheduled value for a mesothelioma claim is $25,000,125 so the
actual payment received under expedited review (after application
of the 10% payment percentage)1 6 would be only $2,500. Yet the
maximum value available under individual review is $400,000,127
which would result in an actual payment of sixteen times the
scheduled value payment ($40,000). The scheduled and maximum
values at the THAN trust are likewise $150,000 and $900,000,128
respectively, which results in a difference in actual payments
received of $225,000 after accounting for the trust's 30% payment
percentage 129 (($900,000-$150,000) x 0.3=$225,000). Claimants
typically pursue claims against between two and three dozen
trusts,130 and electing individual review at even a small number of
re Garlock Sealing Techs., Inc., Case No. 10-31607, at 61-62 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
Jan. 10, 2014).
123 Judicial Education Program Transcript, supra note 7, at 505.
124 Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 113, at 3.
125 Lummus 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust Distribution Procedures, LUMMUS
524(G) ASBESTOS PI TRUST, at § 5.2(b)(3), http://www.abblummustrust.org/
Files/lummus tdp.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Lummus TDP].
126 This reduction was attributed to the fact that "more cancer claims have
been filed with the Trust in its first three years of operations than were forecast
during the bankruptcy case to be filed over the 40 year life of the Trust." See
Letter to Holders of TDP Determined Lummus Asbestos PI Trust Claims,
LUMMus 524(g) ASBESTOS PI TRUST, at 1 (June 13, 2011), http://www.abblum
mustrust.org/Files/20110616_LummusLetterToTDPClaimHolders.pdf.127 Lummus TDP, supra note 125, at § 5.2(b)(3).
128 T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L. C. First Amended Asbestos Personal
Injury Trust Distribution Procedures, THAN ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY
TRUST, at § 5.3(b)(3), http://www.thanasbestostrust.com/Files/20110401_THAN
TDP.PDF (last visited Oct. 19,2013) [hereinafter THAN TDP].
129 See id; T H Agriculture & Nutrition, L.L. C. Asbestos Personal Injury
Trust Payment Percentage Notice, THAN ASBESTOS PERSONAL INJURY TRUST,
http://www.thanasbestostrust.com/Files/20110321 THANPaymentPercentage
Notice.PDF (last visited Oct. 19, 2013).130 See ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 12.
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these trusts may have a dramatic impact on any given plaintiffs
aggregate trust recoveries. 13 1
The obvious response to this explanation is that, according to a
recent Government Accountability Office (GAO) report, only 2-
3% of claimants actually avail themselves of individual review. 132
The basis for this estimate is unclear,1 33 but it is dramatically lower
than the individual review rates reported by the few trusts that
include this information in their annual reports.' 34 For example,
31.4% of the cancer and severe asbestosis claims submitted to the
Combustion Engineering Trust in 2011 requested individual
review, and 30.4% of cancer and severe asbestosis claims paid that
year were individual review claims. 135 In 2010, 25.3% of the
cancer and severe asbestos claims submitted and 44.1% of the
claims in these categories that were paid were individual review
claims.136 Similarly, individual review claims comprised 61.6% of
the cancer and asbestosis claims that were paid by the Lummus
Trust in 2011. 1' The discrepancy may simply capture the
difference in claiming approaches across trusts or between severe
injury claims and asymptomatic claims.' 38 In any case, the 2-3%
131 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 553-55.
132 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 20.
133 The report does not specify how this figure was reached or cite to any
other sources in support of this figure. Id at 20.
134 Annual Report, Financial Statements and Results of Operations of the
ABB Lummus Global Inc. 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust for Fiscal Year Ended
December 31, 2011, LUMMUS 524(G) ASBESTOS PI TRUST, at 5-6,
http://www.abblummustrust.org/Files/ABBLummus AnnualReport 2011 .pdf
(last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Lummus Annual Report 2011]
(demonstrating that 12% of claimants opted for individual review with the
Lummus Trust in 2011); Amended Annual Report, Financial Statements and
Results of Operations of the Combustion Engineering 524(g) Asbestos PI Trust
for Fiscal Year Ended December 31, 2010, COMBUSTION ENGINEERING 524(G)
ASBESTOS PI TRUST, at 5, www.cetrust.org/docs/20110809 CEAnnual Repo
rt_2010.pdf (last visited Oct. 19, 2013) [hereinafter Combustion Annual Report
2010] (demonstrating that 10% of claimants opted for individual review with the
CE Trust in 2010).
1s See Combustion Annual Report 2011, supra note 116, at 4-5.
136 See Combustion Annual Report 2010, supra note 134, at 5.
1 See Lummus Annual Report 2011, supra note 134, at 5-6.
138 See id. at 5-6 (demonstrating that 24% of Category A claimants opted
for individual review with the Lummus Trust in 2011); Combustion Annual
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figure does not appear to be accurate with respect to all claim
categories across trusts, especially higher value claims.
Second, these accounts assume that plaintiffs receive
payments at post-bankruptcy payment percentage levels, which are
frequently far lower than initial levels, especially for high-value
mesothelioma claims.139 The Lummus TDP began with a 100%
payment percentage,140 making the difference between the post-
petition scheduled value payment ($25,000 x 0.1) and the
maximum value payment ($400,000 x 1) for those who filed
claims in the bankruptcy case of $397,500. Applying the same
approach to the THAN Trust, which also applied a 100% payment
percentage to claims filed in the bankruptcy case, 141 we see a
difference between post-payment percentage reduction scheduled
value ($150,000 x 0.3) and original payment percentage maximum
value ($900,000 x 1) of $855,000. Moreover, even if we use only
scheduled values, the difference between the pre-payment
percentage and post-payment percentage figures for mesothelioma
claims against the Lummus and THAN trusts are $22,500 and
$105,000, respectively. Finally, given that maximum payment caps
may not apply to claims that are settled pre-petition but are
nonetheless paid through the bankruptcy trust, actual bankruptcy
payments to some claimants may exceed even the maximum value
* 142payment level in some cases.
c. Trust Confidentiality and Sole-Benefit Provisions
Although some trusts previously sold or licensed their claim
information freely,14 3 most bankruptcy trusts currently treat claim
Report 2010, supra note 134, at 5 (demonstrating that 25% of Category A
claimants opted for individual review with the CE Trust in 2010).
139 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 555-56.
140 Lummus TDP, supra note 125, at § 4.2.
14' THAN TDP, supra note 128, at § 4.3.
142 See Plant Insulation Company Asbestos Personal Injury Settlement
Trust Distribution Procedures, PLANT ASBESTOS SETTLEMENT TRUST, at § 2.4
(Nov. 2012), http://pastrust.com/drupal/sites/default/files/documents/Plant%20T
rust%20Distribution%20Procedures.pdf.
143 See, FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 11.
322 [Vol. 23
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
submissions and payments as confidential.144 Beginning in 2006,
new trusts included TDP language requiring the trusts to treat
claim submissions, discussions, and payments as confidential
"settlement negotiations," and several older trusts amended their
TDPs to include similar provisions.14 5 These provisions obligate
trustees to "take all necessary and appropriate steps" to resist
disclosure of this information unless authorized by the claimant or
required under applicable law.146 Accordingly, co-defendants are
unlikely to find most trusts cooperative when they attempt to
investigate plaintiffs' trust submissions and payments. 147
Nonetheless, these provisions do not present an
insurmountable bar to disclosure. 148 As Justice Heitler of New
York recently observed, the mere fact that the bankruptcy trusts
were established under federal law does not preclude a state court
from requiring plaintiffs "to make full disclosure of information
that is material and necessary to the litigation pending before it."1 49
Likewise, the only bankruptcy court to consider the question of its
role in third party discovery of trust information-in that case,
discovery sought directly from the trusts-concluded that the court
overseeing the discovery, not the bankruptcy court that approved
the creation of the trust, had exclusive jurisdiction over any
discovery disputes.'5 0 This conclusion is not only a reflection of
the reality of the trust confidentiality provisions at issue-namely,
14 See LLOYD DIXON ET AL., ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS: AN
OVERVIEW OF TRUST STRUCTURE AND ACTIVITY WITH DETAILED REPORTS ON
THE LARGEST TRUSTS xvii (2010).
145 Marc C. Scarcella & Peter R. Kelso, Asbestos Bankruptcy Trusts: A
2012 Overview of Trust Assets, Compensation & Governance, 11:11 MEALEY'S
ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. 9 (June 2012).
146 Id. at 10.
147 See Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 113, at 11-12.
148 See, e.g., Volkswagon of Am., Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d
723, 733 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006).
149 1n re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., No. 40000/88, at 8 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Nov.
15, 2012), available at http://www.nycal.net/PDFs/orders/Heitler PocDecision
11 1512.pdf.
150 In re AC&S, Inc. v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS
2962, at *17-18 (Bankr. D. Del. Aug. 8, 2011) (noting that even if the court had
subject matter jurisdiction, it would abstain from exercising jurisdiction in
deference to the court in which the discovery dispute was pending).
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that plan proponents have inserted them to advance their own
private interests and may be altered at the sole discretion of trust
officials' 5 '-but also the fact that the Bankruptcy Code does not in
any way purport to alter another forum's control over its own
discovery process.152 And, as the Court of Appeals of the Third
Circuit recently noted, trusts, unlike typical administrative
schemes, "place the authority to adjudicate claims in private rather
than public hands, a difference that has at times given us and other
observers pause, since it endows potentially interested parties with
considerable authority."l53
C. Discovery and Introduction of Trust Information as
Evidence in the Tort System
Although federal law does not bar discovery of trust
information,154 efforts to obtain this information in state court may
still fail where: (1) courts deem it immaterial or unnecessary; or (2)
the mechanisms available in discovery are insufficient to ensure
that it is, in fact, disclosed. 55
1. Are Trust Submissions and Payments Discoverable?
The assessment of whether trust materials are subject to
discovery begins with the question of relevance.1 56 Information is
generally discoverable so long as it "appears reasonably calculated.
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence," even if that
information is ultimately inadmissible at trial.'5 7 And given that
1' See AC&S Asbestos Settlement Trust v. Hartford Accident Indem. Co.,
2011 Bankr. LEXIS 609, at *38-40 n. I1 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 22, 2011).
152 Id. at *43-44.
153 In re Fed.-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir. 2012).
154 DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 63.
1 See In re Motions for Access of Garlock Sealing Techs., L.L.C., 488
B.R. 281, 290 (D. Del. 2013).
156 See Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723,
726-27 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (showing that trust materials may be relevant if
they contain medical history related to exposure).
1 FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). As observed elsewhere, "[m]any states codified
their standard of discovery in exactly the language of Federal Rule 26(b)" and
generally embrace the broad discovery model. Jeffrey W. Stempel, Politics and
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trust documents include information about a plaintiffs asserted
exposures, work history, and medical condition-all of which are
directly at issue in such cases-most courts have had little
difficulty in concluding that trust forms are discoverable. 158 As
New York Justice Helen Friedman observed:
[W]hile the proofs of claim are partially settlement
documents, they are also presumably accurate statements
of the facts concerning asbestos exposure of the plaintiffs.
While they may be filed by the attorneys, the attorneys do
stand in the shoes of the plaintiffs and an attorney's
statement is an admission under New York law.
Therefore, any factual statements made in the proofs of
claim about alleged asbestos exposure of the plaintiff to
one of the bankrupt's products should be made available
to the defendants who are still in the cases.159
Although trust forms may be discoverable, plaintiffs argue that
trusts are akin to settling defendants, 60 so all communications
should be subject to settlement privilege. 16 1 Although non-settling
co-defendants might enjoy considerable benefits from using a
plaintiffs statements made in connection with negotiating
settlements with settling co-defendants, the settlement privilege
exists to prevent such statements from being used at trial to
Sociology in Federal Civil Rulemaking: Errors of Scope, 52 ALA. L. REv. 529,
601 (2001).
158 Shepherd v. Pneumo-Abex, L.L.C., MDL 875, No. 09-91428, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90122, at *2-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010); In re Asbestos Prods.
Liab. Litig., 2009 WL 6869437, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2009) (citing several
unreported orders); In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., 36 Misc. 3d 1234(A), at *7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2012); Volkswagen, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 729.
159 Negrepont v. A.C. & S., Inc., Index No. 120894/01 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec.
11,2003).
160 Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 6; Lorenzo Mendizabal, Asbestos and
Secrecy: The Confidentiality Battle, 31 AM. BANKR. INST. J. 38, 38 (2012).
161 See In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., No. 40000/88, at 6 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
Nov. 15, 2012).
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promote "free and frank" settlement discussions. 162 Thus, plaintiffs'
ostensible concern is that disclosure of trust materials will interfere
with their free and frank discussions with trusts and, ultimately,
their ability to settle trust claims.163
Most courts to consider the question have concluded that trust
forms are, nonetheless, discoverable. 164 As an initial matter, few
jurisdictions have extended the settlement privilege to discovery;
rather, the question for discovery remains whether the material
sought is relevant.165 Even if the privilege applies to discovery in
the state, most courts have concluded that claim forms are more
akin to filing a complaintl 66 -which, of course, is not privileged-
than the free and frank discussions contemplated by the
privilege. 167 Although trusts and claimants may subsequently
engage in such discussions, the disclosure of claims forms should
not interfere with them any more than submitting a complaint
interferes with settlement in the tort system. 168 Moreover, the case
162 United States v. Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. 705, 712 (D. Minn.
1976); Goodyear Tire and Rubber Co. v. Chiles Power Supply, Inc., 332 F.3d
976, 980 (6th Cir. 2003).
163 See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 31-32 (discussing
confidentiality of trusts).
164 See Nat'1 Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Porter Hayden Co., 2012 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 23716, at *16-17 (D. Md. Feb. 24, 2012); Shepherd v. Pneumo-Abex,
L.L.C., MDL 875, No. 09-91428, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 90122, at *1-2 (E.D.
Pa. Aug. 30, 2010); In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 2009 WL
6869437, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 18, 2009); Volkswagen of Am., Inc. v.
Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 724 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006). But see
Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc., 2013 R.I. Super. LEXIS 128, at *27 (R.I. Super.
Ct. June 15, 2013) (finding that trust information was "not relevant to the
Plaintiffs burden of causation" under Rhode Island law and, accordingly,
denying discovery of trust claim forms); revised on reconsideration at
Sweredoski v. Alfa Laval, Inc., C.A. No. PC-2011-1544, at 7 (R.I. Super. Ct.
Nov. 18, 2013) (ordering in camera review of the requested documents to
determine if they suggest that the plaintiff "did not frequently at regularly work
in proximity to asbestos contained in Crane products").
161 See Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23716, at *10-11.
166 Ferguson v. Lorillard Tobacco Co., 2011 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 135183, at
*3 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 22, 2011); Volkswagon, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 730; Seariver
Mar., Inc. v. Superior Court, 2006 Cal. App. Unpub. LEXIS 6596, at *5-6 (Cal.
Ct. App. July 28, 2006).
167 Reserve Mining Co., 412 F. Supp. at 712.
168 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 29.
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management orders for New York City 69 and West Virginia 1
which were adopted after negotiation among leading plaintiffs and
defense firms practicing in those jurisdictions-expressly require
disclosure of trust claim forms. 17 1 There is no evidence that this
requirement has impaired free and frank discussion with
bankruptcy trusts or otherwise interfered with trust claim
settlement. 172
2. The Sufficiency of Existing Discovery and Public Materials
Given the foregoing, the mounting calls for state and federal
transparency legislation may appear to be little more than
"solution[s] in search of a problem." 173 Defendants may ask
plaintiffs, through interrogatories and any depositions, searching
questions concerning their exposure and work histories. 174
Moreover, the information linking some trust defendants to
products at several worksites is public knowledge-many trusts
even list approved worksites on their respective websites-so
defendants already have access to this information. 75
169 Amended Case Management Order, In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig., No.
40000/88 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. May 26, 2011).
170 2012 Asbestos Case Management Order With Attached Exhibits, In re
Asbestos Pers. Injury Litig., No. 03-C-9600 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Jan. 6, 2012).
171 See Amended Case Management Order, In re N.Y.C. Asbestos Litig.,
No. 40000/88, at 21 (showing that documents previously produced for trust
claims are discoverable); 2012 Asbestos Case Management Order with Attached
Exhibits, In re Asbestos Pers. Injury Litig., No. 03-C-9600, at 28 (enumerating
the required disclosures).
172 See generally Lee Blanton Ziffer, Bankruptcy Trusts and Asbestos
Litigation, AM. BAR AsS'N (June 11, 2012), http://apps.americanbar.org/litig
ation/committees/products/articles/spring2012-bankruptcy-trusts-asbestos-
litigation.html (explaining that, although no specific settlement information is
available due to confidentiality, total trust payments and settlements have
steadily increased).
1 Fact ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 36 (dissenting views).
174 See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 29 (noting that "all potentially
relevant information about an individual's exposure to asbestos, work history, or
other evidence submitted to the trusts may be available through the pretrial
discovery process").
175 Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 9; see Brown, Forever, supra note 13,
at 560-61 (making note of the use of "approved job site lists" when evaluating
claims).
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Notwithstanding the trend toward requiring plaintiffs to
disclose trust submissions, 176 defendants contend that plaintiffs do
not, in fact, provide these materials in discovery.177 Setting aside
the possibility that some lawyers simply choose to violate
applicable discovery orders, professionals who are not involved in
the state court litigation may be responsible for submitting claims
to bankruptcy trusts, and the lawyers overseeing the litigation may
neglect to verify that no such submissions have been made.' 78
Whatever the reason, the cases in which plaintiffs have failed to
disclose trust claims submitted before or during trial may be
characterized as inadvertent; the product of sloppiness or innocent
mistakes rather than fraud.179
Moreover, competent counsel should be able to avoid
disclosure without the risk of becoming embroiled in any such
scandals; largely the same result can be achieved with far less
likelihood of discovery and potential sanctions by simply deferring
trust submissions until after the state court proceedings
conclude. 1so Indeed, some of these lawyers may not even
investigate trust-related disclosures to any significant degree until
this point, and, in the absence of such investigation, may not have
an enforceable obligation to disclose these potential trust
submissions. 1s
The potential for such manipulation is well-established, but
participants disagree concerning the extent to which it is being
exploited by plaintiffs.' 82 RAND's Institute for Civil Justice 83 and
176 Shepherd v. Pneumo-Abex, L.L.C., MDL 875, No. 09-91428, 2010 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 90122, at *1-2 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 30, 2010) (finding trust materials
discoverable and discussing other cases that have found likewise); In re
Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig. (No. VI), 2009 WL 6869437, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Sept.
18, 2009) (ordering the plaintiff to turn over trust documents to the defendant);
Volkswagon of Am., Inc. v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. Rptr. 3d 723, 730-31 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2006) (illustrating that the court did not treat claim forms as settlement
documents and, therefore, deeming them discoverable).
177 DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 18.
178 Judicial Education Program Transcript, supra note 7, at 508, 515.
'79 See id. at 508 (describing circumstances that lead to failure to disclose
trust claims).
180 ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 114-15.
181 Id.
182 DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 19.
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the GAO,184 for example, have acknowledged this potential where
trusts, among other things, treat such submissions as confidential,
allow claimants to defer submissions until after parallel state court
litigation concludes, and refuse to consider plaintiffs' failure to
identify the trusts' predecessors' products in state court
proceedings. 185 Moreover, although some plaintiffs' lawyers
interviewed for the 2011 RAND study objected to the suggestion
that such gamesmanship occurs, others confirmed that they do, in
fact, defer trust filings where they believe it will benefit their
clients. 186 The question, then, is not whether the trust system
creates the potential for imbalanced linkages or some plaintiffs'
lawyers exploit this potential; neither question is seriously in
dispute. 187
The question that has not been answered, and cannot be
answered definitively, given the limited available public
information, 188 is how frequently this potential is exploited. In
support of their assertions that such manipulation is pervasive,1 89
trust reform advocates frequently point to a half-dozen or so cases
where plaintiffs failed to disclose known trust exposures
notwithstanding applicable law or case management orders
requiring them to do so. 190 Plaintiffs' lawyers and trust officials
counter that these cases are anecdotal and comprise only a
' Id. at 29-30.
184 GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 29.
185 DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 29-30 (showing that it is
beneficial for plaintiffs to defer making trust claims until after their tort claims
are resolved); GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 28.
186 DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 19.
1" See id
188 Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency (FACT) Act of 2013: Hearing
on H.R. 982 Before the Judiciary Comm.'s Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform,
Commercial, and Antitrust Law 11 (2013) (statement of Marc Scarcella)
[hereinafter FACT Act Testimony] (illustrating why there is a lack of public
information).
189 ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 58-59.
190 DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 69; 2012 Asbestos Case
Management Order With Attached Exhibits, In re Asbestos Pers. Injury Litig.,
No. 03-C-9600, at 45 (Cir. Ct. W. Va. Jan. 6, 2012) (illustrating a CMO
requiring disclosure).
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miniscule portion of the asbestos cases and trust claims filed.19'
Yet, defendants do not commonly have the power to subpoena
bankruptcy submissions or trust claim forms after their cases settle,
and trusts do not disclose claim-level information in their
reports;192 so, it is unclear how these defendants would discover
undisclosed and deferred trust claim submissions. Even where
some of these defendants have subsequently commenced
bankruptcy and sought this information, courts frequently reject
these requests,' 93 and the discovery that is allowed will be subject
to protective orders precluding public disclosure of that
information.
In sum, it remains unclear precisely how much of the billions
of dollars in trust recoveries paid each year, and the exposures
supporting those recoveries, are not accounted for in the tort
system. 195 Given the sheer volume of claims controlled by the
lawyers interviewed for the 2011 RAND Report,196 however, the
fact that some freely acknowledge deferring submissions to evade
discovery may suggest that the linkage imbalance is more
substantial than bankruptcy trusts and plaintiffs' advocates
acknowledge. 197
191 ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 147.
192 See supra Part I.B.2.c.
193 See, e.g., In re Motions for Access of Garlock Sealing Techs. L.L.C.,
488 B.R. 281, 290, 294 (D. Del. 2013) (discussing the history of Garlock's
efforts to obtain discovery concerning Bankruptcy Rule 2019 statements); In re
Specialty Prods. Holdings Corp., 2011 Bankr. LEXIS 3759, at *1, *14 (Bankr.
D. Del. Oct. 7, 2011) (denying a motion seeking information from law firms
who have represented claimants in asbestos cases).
194 Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 867.
'95 FACTAct Testimony, supra note 188, at 2-3.
196 See DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xiii.
197 Id. at xvi. In the Garlock bankruptcy, the court allowed the debtor
discovery into fifteen cases the debtor previously settled "for large sums" and
found that "exposure evidence was withheld in each and every one of them." In
re Garlock Sealing Techs., Inc., Case No. 10-31607, at 31 (Bankr. W.D.N.C.
Jan. 10, 2014) (emphasis in original). The number of disclosed trust exposures
ranged from zero to seven (with a mean of one), while the number of
undisclosed trust exposures ranged from four to twenty-six (with a mean of
twenty-two). Id. at 34. Although the court recognized that this was not
"purported to be a random or representative sample," it nonetheless reasoned
that "the fact that each and every one of them contains such demonstrable
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III. STATE-LEVEL INITIATIVES
At the state level, some legislatures have considered proposals
designed to incorporate both representations to bankruptcy trusts
(addressing the exposure linkage) and the payments made by the
trusts (addressing the compensation linkage) fully into the asbestos
personal injury litigation within their respective state courts. 98
This section outlines the common features of this legislation, its
potential for correcting any imbalances in the linkages between the
tort and trust systems, and the arguments advanced in opposition to
these initiatives.
A. Key Features ofRecent Legislation
To date, two states-Ohio' 99 and Oklahoma 20 0-have adopted
legislation that addresses plaintiffs' obligations with respect to
bankruptcy trust disclosures in the tort system. 20 1 Other states have
considered, or are in the process of considering, similar
202
legislation. Moreover, as noted previously, the general case
management orders for asbestos cases in some jurisdictions contain
misrepresentation is surprising and persuasive" and "[i]t appears certain that
more extensive discovery would show more extensive abuse." Id. at 35
(emphasis in original). Thus, the court concluded, "[t]he withholding of
exposure evidence by plaintiffs and their lawyers was significant and had the
effect of unfairly inflating the recoveries against Garlock from 2000 through
2010." Id. at 37.
198 See Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 845-46, 866-67;
DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xvi.
199 OHIo REV. CODE ANN. §§ 2307.951-2307.954 (LexisNexis 2013).
200 The new law, entitled the "Personal Injury Trust Fund Transparency
Act," was codified in the Oklahoma Statutes at sections 81-89 of title 76. OKLA.
STAT. tit. 76, §§ 81-89 (2013).
201 See id.; §§ 2307.951-2307.954.
202 Eric Gardner, Product Liability Trends and Developments: Multiple
States Considering Changes to Asbestos Transparency Laws, ALSTON & BIRD
LLP, http://www.alston.com/productsliabilityblog/blog.aspx?entry=4858 (last
visited Sept. 22, 2013); Kirk Hartley, Asbestos Bankruptcies Back in the News,
GLOBALTORT, http://www.globaltort.com/2013/03/asbestos-bankruptcies-back-
in-the-news/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2013).
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provisions that mirror some of the key elements of this
legislation. 203
This discussion will center on the legislation passed in Ohio
and Oklahoma for two reasons. First, although the various
proposals across the states have varied at the margins, these laws
are representative of the proposals advanced in other states to date
in all material respects. Second, these laws appear likely to serve
as models for future legislation, or at least as starting points for
developing such legislation; so, a thorough discussion of their
terms and implications may be useful in suggesting modifications
or improvements to address the specific circumstances present in
these other states.205
1. Ohio
Ohio House Bill 380 was introduced in November 2011 after
earlier attempts to pass similar legislation failed.206 The bill passed
the Ohio House of Representatives in January 2012, passed the
Ohio Senate in December 2012, and was signed into law on
December 20, 2012.207 The Law may be found in the Ohio Revised
Code at sections 2307.951-2307.954 (hereinafter, the Ohio Act).208
The Ohio Act has four main features, 209 which are discussed in
turn below.
First, the Ohio Act imposes certain disclosure obligations
concerning trust claims that are filed before or during the
203 Compare supra notes 169-71 and accompanying text, with
§ 2307.952(A)(1)(a), and tit. 76 § 84(B).
204 See Gardner, supra note 202 (stating that the Ohio legislation has
influenced measures for reform in other states); Hartley, supra note 202 (noting
that states that have not passed statutes are considering similar legislation to that
which has been passed).
205 See Rachel Reynolds, Following in Ohio's Footsteps: The Expansion of
Asbestos Transparency Legislation, SEDGWICK LAW, http://www.sdma.com/
following-in-ohios-footsteps-the-expansion-of-asbestos-transparency-
legislation-05-13-2013/ (last visited Sept. 22, 2013) (explaining that after Ohio's
legislation was passed, "other states and the federal government have followed
suit").
206 H.B. 230, 129th Gen. Assemb. (as introduced, Ohio 2011-2012).
207 H.B. 230, 129th Gen. Assemb. (as signed, Ohio 2011-2012).
208 See §§ 2307.951-2307.954.
209 See §§ 2307.952(A)(1)(a), 2307.953(A)(1), 2307.954(B), (D)-(F).
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proceedings. 210 "Within thirty days after the commencement of
discovery," section 2307.952(A)(1)(a) requires the plaintiff to
provide all parties in the case with a sworn statement identifying
all existing trust claims and all claims material that pertain to each
trust claim.2 11 This disclosure obligation is ongoing; any new trust
claims filed after this initial disclosure and all claim materials must
be produced within thirty days of their submissions to the trusts.212
If a plaintiff fails to satisfy these requirements the court may refuse
to assign an initial trial date or extend the date set for trial.213
Second, the Ohio Act includes a provision requiring asbestos
plaintiffs to file trust claims if certain conditions are satisfied.2 14 If
a defendant presents evidence that the plaintiff may make a good
faith claim against trusts other than those that the plaintiff has
previously disclosed, the defendant may request a stay of the
proceedings no less than seventy-five days prior to trial. 215 The
plaintiff then has fourteen days to either submit the claim, object
on the basis that there is insufficient information to submit the
claim, or request a determination from the court that the costs of
submitting the claim exceed the plaintiffs reasonably anticipated
recovery from the trust.2 16 If disputed and the court concludes by a
preponderance of the evidence that a trust claim could be filed in
good faith, the court "shall stay the proceedings" until the claimant
files the claim. 217 If the court determines that the fees and expenses
associated with filing a trust claim exceed the plaintiffs reasonably
anticipated recovery from the trust, the court will order the plaintiff
to file a verified statement of his or her exposure history to the
asbestos products covered by the trust.218
2 10 See § 2307.952(A)(1)(a).
211 Id.
212 § 2307.952(A)(2).
213 § 2307.952(B).
214 See § 2307.953(A)(1).
215 See id If the plaintiff produces evidence that supports the filing of an
additional trust claim after this deadline, however, any defendant may request a
stay pending the submission of a claim with this trust within seven days of
receiving the information. See § 2307.953(B).
216 § 2307.953(C)(1).
217 § 2307.953(E).
218 § 2307.953(D)(2).
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Third, the Ohio Act expressly addresses the potential uses of
bankruptcy trust information at trial.219 Under section 2307.954(B),
trust claim information is "presumed to be authentic, relevant to,
and discoverable in an asbestos tort action."220 This section further
provides that claim materials "are presumed to not be privileged"
notwithstanding any private agreement or TDP confidentiality
provisions to the contrary. 221 Moreover, this section expressly
provides that this information may be introduced at trial:
[T]o prove alternative causation for the exposed person's
claimed injury, death, or loss to person, to prove a basis to
allocate responsibility for the claimant's claimed injury,
death, or loss to person, and to prove issues relevant to an
adjudication of the asbestos claim, unless the exclusion of
the trust claims material is otherwise required by the rules
of evidence. 22
2
Finally, the Ohio Act includes several potential sanctions for
non-compliance, even if the abuse is discovered up to one year
after judgment is entered.223 In the event that a defendant discovers
that a plaintiff has not complied with disclosure requirements of
sections 2307.952 and 2307.953, the court is expressly authorized
to order sanctions, including, but not limited to, vacating any
judgment in the plaintiffs favor. 224 The court may also order a
reduction in the judgment in the amount of any post-judgment trust
payments obtained by the plaintiff or order any other relief "that
the court considers just and proper."225
2. Oklahoma
The Oklahoma legislation, Senate Bill 404, was introduced on
February 4, 2013.226 The bill passed the Oklahoma Senate with
219 § 2307.954(B).
221 Id.
221 id
222 id
223 §§ 2307.954(E)(1)(a)-(b), (F).
224 § 2307.954(D).
225 § 2307.954(E).
226 S.B. 404, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (as introduced, Okla. 2013).
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thirty-three votes in favor and eleven votes against on February 26,
2272013. As amended, it passed the Oklahoma House with eighty-
two votes in favor and ten votes against on April 24, 2013, and the
governor signed the bill on May 7, 2013.228 The new law, entitled
the "Personal Injury Trust Fund Transparency Act," was codified
in the Oklahoma Statutes at sections 81-89 of Title 76 (hereinafter,
the Oklahoma Act). 229 The Oklahoma Act is substantially similar
to the Ohio Act, but it extends to all personal injury trusts, not just
asbestos bankruptcy trusts, and the timing of some of its features
varies from the Ohio Act.230
Like the Ohio Act, section 83 the Oklahoma Act imposes
disclosure obligations on plaintiffs concerning the trust claims they
file before and during the state court proceedings.231 Where the
Ohio Act required the initial disclosure within thirty days of the
commencement of discovery, 232 the Oklahoma Act requires the
disclosure of claim forms and materials within ninety days of the
commencement of the case.233 Moreover, the plaintiff is required
to "supplement the information and materials he or she provided
under this section within thirty (30) days after the plaintiff files an
additional claim, supplements an existing claim or receives
additional information or materials." 234 Courts are expressly
authorized to address violations of this section under Oklahoma's
version of Rule 11 and the state's laws concerning sanctions for
discovery violations. 235 Moreover, a trial date may not be
scheduled earlier than 180 days after this disclosure obligation is
satisfied.236
227 S.B. 404, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (as amended, Okla. 2013).
228 S.B. 404, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (as enrolled, Okla. 2013).
22 9 OKLA. STAT. tit. 76 §§ 81-89 (2013).
230 See id.
231 Compare OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.952 (LexisNexis 2013), with
tit. 76 § 83.
232 § 2307.852(A)(1)(a).
233 See tit. 76, §§ 83(A)-(B).
234 See tit. 76, § 83(C).
235 See tit. 76, § 89; OKLA. STAT. tit. 12 §§ 2011, 3237 (2013).
236 See tit. 76, § 85(A).
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Second, the Oklahoma Act also includes a provision requiring
asbestos plaintiffs to file trust claims. 237 If a defendant has a good
faith belief that the plaintiff may make a successful claim against
additional trusts, the defendant may request a stay of the
proceedings no less than ninety days prior to trial.2 38 The plaintiff
then has ten days to either submit the claim, object on the basis that
there is insufficient information to submit the claim, or request a
determination from the court that the costs of submitting the claim
exceed the plaintiffs reasonably anticipated recovery from the
239trust. If disputed, the court shall determine whether there is a
good faith basis for submitting a claim. 240 If so, the court shall
order the plaintiff to file the claim and stay the proceedings until
the claim is filed and all relevant trust forms and materials are
disclosed to other parties in the case.241 If the court concludes that
the costs of submitting a claim exceed the plaintiffs reasonably
anticipated recovery, the court shall stay the proceedings "until the
plaintiff files with the court and produces to all parties a verified
statement of the plaintiffs history of exposure, usage, or other
connection, as relevant, to the products, services, or events covered
by the personal injury trust."24
Third, section 84 largely mirrors the Ohio Act in addressing
the potential uses of bankruptcy trust information at trial.243 Trust
claim materials and governance documents are discoverable 244 and
"presumed to be relevant and authentic, subject to the Rules of
Evidence governing admissibility," and no claims of privilege may
237 See tit. 76, § 86. While not mentioned specifically as "asbestos
plaintiffs," this law extends to all personal injury claims, thus, not prohibiting
asbestos plaintiffs.
237 id
238 See tit. 76, § 86(A)(1). If the plaintiff produces evidence that supports
the filing of an additional trust claim after this deadline, however, any defendant
may request a stay pending the submission of a claim with this trust within
seven days of receiving the information. See tit. 76, § 86(A)(2).
239 See tit. 76, § 86(B).
240 See tit. 76, § 86(C).
241 See tit. 76, § 86(E)(1).
242 See tit. 76, § 86(E)(2).
243 Compare tit. 76, § 84, with OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.954(B)
(LexisNexis 2013).
244 tit. 76, § 84(B).
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apply to these materials and documents. 245 In addition, "any party
may present [these] materials to prove alternative causation" or for
the purposes "of allocating liability for the plaintiffs injury." 246
Unlike the Ohio Act,247 the Oklahoma Act expressly provides
for the calculation of the value of trust claims prior to their
resolution with the trusts and dollar for dollar setoffs of judgments
against one or more solvent defendants. 248 Under section 87, the
court may take judicial notice of a given trust's scheduled value for
the plaintiffs disease and any payment percentage to be applied
where the trust claim remains unliquidated, and there is a
rebuttable presumption that this estimated amount is what the
plaintiff will receive from the trust.249 Under section 88, any
damages awarded against solvent defendants will be reduced by
any such estimated amounts and, with respect to trusts that have
awarded payments to the plaintiff, the actual amounts received.250
B. Arguments For and Against the State Legislation
At this point, it is too early to tell whether the Ohio Act and
the Oklahoma Act will have the effects suggested by plaintiffs and
defendants. 25 1 The Oklahoma Act became effective on November
1, 2013, and the Ohio Act became effective in March 2013.252 By
June 2013, more than eighty motions to compel compliance with
the Ohio Act had been filed, and none of the motions had been
argued. 253 At least one case was settled; several plaintiffs
245 tit. 76, § 84(A).
246 id.
247 Apportionment of liability for asbestos claims in Ohio is covered by
section 2307.22 of the Ohio Revised Code. § 2307.22.
248 tit. 76, §§ 87-88.
249 tit. 76, § 87.
250 tit. 76, § 88.
251 See §§ 2307.951-2307.954 (demonstrating that the Ohio Bill has been
effective since March 2013 and establishing that the legislation is too new for
the effects of it to be determined yet); S.B. 404, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2013)
(establishing that the Oklahoma Act did not become effective until November 1,
2013, thus there is no way to determine its effectiveness yet).
252 See §§ 2307.951-2307.954; S.B. 404, 2013-14 Reg. Sess. (Okla. 2013).
253 American Bar Ass'n, Transcript, Task Force on Asbestos Litigation and
the Bankruptcy Trusts, at 111 (June 5, 2013), available at http://www.american
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submitted certifications that they were in compliance and also
provided defendants with additional trust materials; two others
filed constitutional challenges to the law; and several others
254
requested additional time to respond. These early results tell us
little about the law's application and impact; so, much of the
discussion remains centered on the purpose of the acts and their
express terms.2 55
1. Prompt Disclosure of Trust Materials
The primary argument in favor of state-level legislation is that
it corrects gaps in the current system that deny defendants access
to the information that they are entitled to in discovery. 256 If the
information necessary to build a complete picture of a plaintiffs
exposure is within the sole possession of the plaintiff and there is
no cost to concealing this information at trial, defendants and juries
alike are left to consider only a narrow, manufactured reality
concerning the plaintiffs exposure history that may have little
relationship to the underlying truth.257 Defendants, then, complain
that they must either accommodate inflated settlement demands or
run the risk of ruinous verdicts at trial that are premised upon a
distorted vision of the plaintiffs exposure history.
The question from this perspective is relatively
straightforward: should the civil justice system condone a process
where litigants may advance one set of facts under penalty of
perjury in one forum and a contradictory set of facts under penalty
of perjury in another? The civil justice system typically frowns
upon litigants obtaining relief in one forum based on one set of
facts and pursuing relief in another based on a contradictory set of
bar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/tips/asbestostf/Asbestos Transcript 06
-05-2013.authcheckdam.pdf [hereinafter ABA June 5 Transcript].254 Id. at 111-12.
255 See generally id at 99, 101, 103-05, 110-12 (focusing the discussion on
the purpose and language of the bill, since the early results have proved to be too
varied to draw relevant conclusions).
256 See ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 15-16.
257 See id. at 30-31.
258 See generally id. at 47-49 (discussing the adverse consequences
suffered by defendants when information pertaining to plaintiffs' exposure is
limited).
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facts for a simple reason: it creates the impression "that either the
first or the second . .. was misled" by one or more parties
"deliberately changing positions according to the exigencies of the
moment." 259 And even if the trusts-which are largely designed
and remain subject to oversight by leading plaintiffs' lawyers-are
ultimately content to overlook any inconsistencies,260 defendants
and state courts typically are not.26 1 To that end, legislation that
closes any loopholes that allow litigants to take such an approach
in asbestos litigation may be seen as merely respecting the truth-
- - 262
seeking function of civil litigation.
The structure of both acts not only works to encourage the
disclosure of trust forms, but also to ensure that the information is
shared in a timely manner.263 Some defendants have complained
that even when plaintiffs share trust materials, they do so on the
eve of trial, long after it can be reviewed and any additional
discovery can be conducted and reasonably incorporated into the
trial plan.26 4
Regardless of whether discovery of trust forms and materials
is allowed in the applicable state court, plaintiffs frequently note
that defendants already have sufficient access to the information
contained in these documents to prepare a defense.265 Defendants
are free to use many of the same public databases and other
materials that plaintiffs' lawyers use to identify possible sources of
exposure, and they also have the right to depose potential
259 New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 749-50 (2001) (quoting United
States v. McCaskey, 9 F.3d 368, 378 (5th Cir. 1993); Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins.
Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)). As the Garlock bankruptcy court
recently observed, "while it is not suppression of evidence for a plaintiff to be
unable to identify exposures, it is suppression of evidence for a plaintiff to be
unable to identify exposure in the tort case, but then later (and in some cases
previously) to be able to identify it in Trust claims." In re Garlock Sealing
Techs., Inc., Case No. 10-31607, at 36-37 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Jan. 10, 2014).
260 See ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 18-21, 23
(demonstrating the pro-plaintiff policies in trusts and including an example of a
trust that turned a blind-eye to clear inconsistent filings).
261 See id. at 32-33.
262 See id. at 51-52.
263 See id. at 50.
264 See ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 99-100.
265 See supra Part I.C.2.
2013] 339
WIDENER LAW JOURNAL
witnesses concerning these exposures. 266 Defense lawyers, like
plaintiffs' lawyers, are repeat players, and they or their firms
typically track plaintiffs' alleged exposures to other defendants'
267products across cases. To that end, plaintiffs' lawyers contend
that this requirement does little more than require them to do the
defendants' work for them: identifying and building the case
against the "empty chair" that solvent defendants will then attempt
to try in order to avoid responsibility for their own roles in causing
* 268a plaintiffs injuries.
This characterization of the acts, however appealing as a
rhetorical matter, is not entirely accurate. 269 Defendants must still
use the information available to them to demonstrate that "good
faith" exists to file any suggested trust claim. 270 The plaintiff
remains free to demonstrate that the defendant has not
demonstrated good cause for submitting a trust claim, 27' but the
statutes likewise attempt to foreclose the option of changing course
and filing trust claims once the litigation concludes. 272 If, on the
other hand, the plaintiff intended to pursue trust claims at a later
date, this component of the legislation requires-and enables
defendants to demand-that such claims be advanced prior to
273trial.
266 Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 9.
267 id
268 Id.; CertainTeed Corp. v. Dexter, 330 S.W.3d 64, 70 (Ky. 2010)
(showing that the defendants can avoid liability by assigning liability to "empty-
chair" defendants).
269 See generally OKLA. STAT. tit. 76 § 86(A) (2013) (dispelling the
characterization that this statute unfairly benefits defendants by illustrating that
the defendant will have the burden of showing why the plaintiff should make
claims against other trusts and that the plaintiff has the ability to rebut any such
showing).
270 See OHIo REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.953(A) (LexisNexis 2013); tit. 76,
§ 86.
271 tit. 76, § 86.
272 § 2307.954(E) (showing that courts can adjust an award amount after
trial if the plaintiff makes and prevails on any subsequent claims).
273 See Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 8 (showing that defendants can
force plaintiffs to make trust claims prior to trial).
340 [Vol. 23
BANKRUPTCY TRUSTS
2. The Use of Trust Materials at Trial
Both the Ohio Act and Oklahoma Act, however, go beyond
merely affording defendants with access to relevant information:
they mandate the submission of trust claim forms and treat them as
presumptively "relevant and authentic." 274 Thus, critics argue that
the legislation unfairly requires plaintiffs to create evidence that
will be introduced against them at trial.275 And this, in turn, could
undermine .laintiffs' position should the evidence be misconstrued
by the jury.
The concern that juries provided with trust information "may
well assign fault to the insolvent defendants" is reasonable. 2 77
Neither act dictates what weight juries must give to trust forms and
materials in assigning fault and liability, and plaintiffs are free to
demonstrate the distinctions in trust and tort exposure criteria.278
Nonetheless, the knowledge that a plaintiff acknowledged at least
some level of exposure under penalty of perjury-regardless of
whether it was voluntary or mandated upon the court's conclusion
that such a claim could be made in good faith-may be far more
compelling in shaping juries' assessments than whatever other
evidence the defendants may be able to advance, particularly in
light of the inherent limitations of demonstrating direct exposure
outlined in Part I.A. 1.279
Moreover, this risk may be particularly high where a plaintiffs
exposure to a solvent defendant's product is modest.280 Across
cases, plaintiffs frequently rely upon expert testimony that any
exposure, however remote or minor it may be, is sufficient to
conclude that a defendant's actions were substantial contributing
274 § 2307.952(A); tit. 76, § 83.
275 Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 8.
276 See id.
277 id
278 See §§ 2307.952-2307.954 (showing that nothing directs how juries
must weigh the evidence and that nothing precludes plaintiffs from making
distinctions as to exposure).
279 Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 8 (showing that juries may allocate
fault to multiple defendants if there is evidence of multiple exposures); see
supra Part I.A.1.
280 See DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 65 (showing that even one
percent fault can establish liability).
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factors to a plaintiffs injury.281 And, in these cases, it is easy to see
how juries may take this expert testimony to heart not only with
respect to solvent defendants but also bankrupt defendants when
allocating fault.282 Of course, this is precisely the point from the
defense perspective: if plaintiffs advance such inclusive theories of
exposure to establish causation, they should not complain if
defendants point to those same theories to prove alternative
causation or support lower several liability allocations. 283
In states where such provisions are adopted, judges will play a
critical role in balancing the parties' interests, just as they do with
other evidentiary questions. Judges remain free to ensure that
any evidentiary value of trust forms and materials will be "subject
to the Rules of Evidence," 285 through jury instructions and
286otherwise. Trust governance and procedure documents, which
are admissible under the acts passed to date, 287 may be referenced
to limit the potential confusion between exposure standards under
tort law and those at the different trusts.288 Thus, one's assessment
of the potential for tilting the scales in favor of defendants may
hinge upon his or her perception of the capacity and willingness of
281 For examples of such testimony, see In re Asbestos Prods. Liab. Litig.
(No. VI), 2012 WL 760739 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 17, 2012) (noting expert testimony
that "all of Mr. Freeman's non-trivial exposures to asbestos above background
levels were substantial factors in causing the development of his malignant
mesothelioma"); ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 179-80.
282 See Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 8 (illustrating that juries will rely
on the evidence to assign fault to the various defendants).
283 ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 15-17 (showing that defense
attorneys feel that they should be entitled to make the same claims that plaintiffs
are making against other defendants in order to prove percentage of liability).
284 See Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 8 (noting that judges make
decisions as to what claim information juries will be shown); DIXON &
MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 63 (showing that judges weigh the value against
the harm in determining admissibility).
285 OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 86(A) (2013); DIXoN & McGOVERN, supra note
42, at 63.
286 ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 120 (showing that judges
give jury instructions); DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 63 (showing that
a judge can otherwise enforce the rules of evidence by denying the admission of
evidence).
287 tit. 76, § 84(A).
288 See id.
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judges to use the tools available to assist the jury in reaching a fair
and equitable verdict.289
3. The Potential for Delay and Abuse
The state-level legislative initiatives advanced to date invite
criticism that they will delay trial because, as noted, they allow
defendants to demand that plaintiffs submit trust claims and
provide for a stay of trial if this obligation is not satisfied.290
Conventional wisdom is that delay serves defendants' interests, 291
so plaintiffs' objections to the addition of an express statutory
mechanism that may allow defendants to postpone trial are
understandable.292 This concern is magnified in asbestos litigation
because trial dates are already delayed by case volumes that strain
judicial resources. 293 And, though the vast majority of cases
294im ietcn a an toln
settle, having an imminent trial date can be an important tool in
295getting to the finish line in settlement negotiations.
289 See ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 51-52.
290 See Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 8.
291 Francis E. McGovern, Rethinking Cooperation Among Judges in Mass
Tort Litigation, 44 UCLA L. REv. 1851, 1858 (1997) (characterizing delay as
the defendants' "nirvana"); Tung Yin, Comment, Nailing Jello to a Wall: A
Uniform Approach for Adjudicating Insurance Coverage Disputes in Products
Liability Cases with Delayed Manifestation Injuries and Damages, 83 CALIF. L.
REv. 1243, 1292 n.321 (1995).
Delay produces several benefits: (1) any damages they must pay as a
result of future determinations of liability are discounted to present
value; (2) some plaintiffs will die before reaching trial, reducing the
damages in those instances; and (3) by forcing each plaintiff to
litigate every issue, the defendants can drive the cost of litigation high
enough to dissuade some plaintiffs with smaller claims from pursuing
them.
Id.
292 See Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 9.
293 See Richard A. Nagareda, Autonomy, Peace, and Put Options in the
Mass Tort Class Action, 115 HARV. L. REv. 747, 764 (2002).
294 Paul D. Carrington, Asbestos Lessons: The Consequences of Asbestos
Litigation, 26 REV. LITIG. 583, 590 (2007).
295 Id. at 593; Steven L. Schulz, In re Joint Eastern and Southern District
Asbestos Litigation: Bankrupt and Backlogged - A Proposal for the Use of
Federal Common Law in Mass Tort Class Action, 58 BROOK. L. REV. 553, 562
(1992).
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This risk is moderated by the limitations imposed on the right
to obtain a stay,296 which have received little attention in public
discussion concerning the state legislation to date.297 In addition to
the good faith requirement, both statutes contain avenues for
avoiding any stay by submitting the suggested claim, objecting to
the request, or demonstrating that the costs of filing exceed likely
recoveries. 298 In addition, the statutory limitations period
concerning the timing of any stay request (seventy-five days before
trial in Ohio299 and ninety days in Oklahoma 300) were included to
reduce the prospects that any such request would be a mere ploy to
postpone trial. 0 Nothing in these statutes strips courts of their
inherent powers to sanction those who might otherwise seek to
abuse the process,302 and the court has the final say as to whether
the plaintiff will be required to submit any additional claims with
bankruptcy trusts.303 Again, how one views the impact of the
legislation in this respect depends largely on their perspective of
In addition, plaintiffs frequently face incredibly long delays in
receiving their just compensation. While the majority of cases settle
before trial, most defendants will not even enter settlement
negotiations until a plaintiff possesses a trial date. Because courts are
so backlogged with asbestos cases, the fact is that many asbestos
victims will die before receiving any compensation at all.
Id. AccordNagareda, supra note 293, at 764.
In the face of defendants' intransigence during the mature litigation
stage, mass tort plaintiffs' attorneys have only one real bargaining
chip, but it is a big one: their power to take cases to trial. Trial dates
are a scarce resource, limited by the capacity of the judicial system.
But when they do approach, trial dates create conditions ripe for
aggregate settlements.
Id.
296 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2307.953(A) (LexisNexis 2013).
297 See ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 101 (explaining that
state legislation has been slow to start due to confusion over federal or state
regulation).
298 §§ 2307.953(A)(1), (C); ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at
104.
299 § 2307.953(A).
300 OKLA. STAT. tit. 76, § 83(A) (2013).
301 ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 104.
302 Id. at 106-07, 109-10.
303 See id. at 106-07, 124-25.
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state judges' willingness to utilize the tools available to them to
prevent abuse. 304
IV. THE FACT ACT OF 2013
At the federal level, legislation that would require claim-level
transparency by the trusts was introduced in 2012 and again in
2013.305 Where the state-level initiatives imposed obligations on
plaintiffs and their counsel in state court,306 the federal bills would
impose public and private reporting obligations on the trusts. 307
This section analyzes the basic terms of the federal legislation, the
degree to which it may address any imbalanced linkages in the tort
system, and its potential impact on trust governance and
administration.
A. Key Features of the FACTAct
After a push to amend the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure to require mandatory disclosure of trust submissions and
payments stalled,30 s legislation to amend the Bankruptcy Code to
require these disclosures was introduced in 2012. 309 This
legislation, the Furthering Asbestos Claims Transparency (FACT)
Act of 2012, 310 would have amended "section 524(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code to require asbestos trusts to file quarterly
reports" to the bankruptcy court concerning each claim received,
including the name and asserted exposure history of the claimant,
and the basis for any payments made during the quarter. 311
304 See ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 9-10 (explaining how
there are two viewpoints of the prevention of abuse, which depends on how the
court system, including discovery is viewed).
305 Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 113, at 13.
306 See generally id. at 12 (showing how the new law requires a timeline
for filing a tort complaint, and how the court can take away the trial date).
307 Id. at 13.
308 FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 13-14 (noting that this failure was
due to the perception that such requirements were more appropriately left to
Congress).309id
31o H.R. REP. No. 112-687, at 2-3 (2012) [hereinafter FACT ACT OF 2012];
see also FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 14.
31 'FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 14.
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Confidential medical records and the claimant's full social security
number were expressly excluded from these public reports.3 12 In
addition, the legislation sought to require trusts to disclose trust
claim forms and supporting materials to defendants in related state
tort litigation upon request.313 The final version of the bill that was
reported to the House of Representatives also included a provision
that expressly authorized the trusts to charge the defendants a fee
to cover the reasonable costs of complying with any such
requests. 3 14 The Furthering Asbestos Claims Transparency (FACT)
Act of 2013 was identical in all material respects to the final
version of the 2012 act.3 15
B. Arguments Advanced in Favor of the FACT Act
1. Trust Governance and Oversight
Bankruptcy trusts are novel creations in both bankruptcy and
the tort system, so developing rules concerning their governance
and disclosure takes us into uncharted territory. 316 When
confronted with a novel question, advocates commonly draw upon
the rules and practices applicable elsewhere, and this has been true
with respect to discussions concerning the FACT Act. 3 17 As noted
previously, for example, trust officials and plaintiffs' lawyers
routinely characterize the trusts as little more than private entities
that assumed the liabilities of one or more defendants and,
accordingly, suggest that any disclosure obligations should merely
track those applicable to settling defendants in the tort system.3 18
312 Id; FED. R. BANKR. P. 9037(a)(1).
313 See FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 14.
314 See H.R. 982, 113th Cong. (2013) [hereinafter FACT ACT OF 2013]; see
also FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 31.
315 See FACT ACT OF 2013, supra note 314; FACT ACT OF 2012, supra
note 310, at 1-4.
316 See generally FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 3-4, 8-13, 29-30,
32-35, 37, 39 (discussing the novel nature of bankruptcy trusts).
30 See FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 32, 37; see also Brown,
Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 896.
318 See supra note 90. See generally Marc C. Scarcella et al., The
Philadelphia Story: Asbestos Litigation, Bankruptcy Trusts and Changes in
Exposure Allegations From 1991-2010, 27:17 MEALEY's LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS
1-2, 9, 12 (Oct. 10, 2012) (discussing that "plaintiff attorneys refocused their
346 [Vol. 23
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From a governance perspective, however, it may be more
instructive to view the trusts as extensions of the bankruptcy
estate. 3 19 Like their debtor-in-possession predecessors, bankruptcy
trusts manage a limited fund.320 They also assume a role most often
left to the court: post-confirmation claim review and approval.32'
Their diligence, or lack thereof, in settling these competing claims
to the limited fund will have a clear impact on all others with
rightful claims to the fund. 322 The purposes underlying the
establishment of each trust-including equality of distribution
across creditors-and the risks of manipulation of the process by
the private actors who control them will undermine these purposes;
thus, suggesting a need for greater oversight and transparency than
private settlements in the tort system. 323
litigation strategy on defendants who previously had only been peripheral
sources of plaintiff compensation" and stating that "[t]hese trusts assume the
legal responsibility of the Reorganized Defendant's asbestos-related liability
and, in turn, are funded with assets intended to pay compensable claims");
Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 4, 7, 9 (discussing the Mansville Trust and
how it "assumed the debtors' present and future liabilities," the interplay
between the tort system and bankruptcy trusts, and how defendants have access
to information by discovery, just as plaintiffs do in the tort system).
319 See, e.g., In re Thorpe Insulation Co., 677 F.3d 869, 878, 889-90 (9th
Cir. 2012) (noting that a debtor's rights to insurance may be transferred to
bankruptcy trusts because section 541(c) of the Bankruptcy Code invalidates
contractual restrictions on assignment to the estate, and, in the asbestos
bankruptcy context, the debtor is merely transferring "its rights and property to
the trust, part of the estate").
320 See Inselbuch et. al., supra note 26, at 4; FACT ACT REPORT, supra
note 29, at 32. See generally 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (2012) (discussing the duties of a
debtor-in-possession).
321 See Inselbuch et al., supra note 26, at 4.
322 See id (explaining how the trusts' diligence in settling the claims from
present and future claimants allows for these present and future claimants to
have recourse to the assets of the trust).
323 See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 14; see also Brown, Without
Compromise, supra note 17, at 896-97, 900-01. There are, of course, other ways
in which trusts vary from solvent defendants in the tort system. See DIXON &
McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xv. Solvent defendants are free to adapt their
settlement strategies to reflect their experiences, changes in underlying law and
procedure, and so on. See GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 3, 27. Trusts, by
contrast, tend to follow largely the same model of claim review as their
predecessors, without regard for variations in state law, and they must obtain the
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In this context, transparency serves two basic objectives. 324
First, it provides a means of holding fiduciaries accountable; if
there is no risk of discovery or accountability, the risk is always
present that the fiduciary will become more beholden to other
interests than those he or she represents. 325 Second, the absence of
transparency lends itself to questions about the integrity and
legitimacy of the process, 326 especially where the system
consistently generates poor outcomes for stakeholders. 327 And,
given the trust system's recent performance, 328 legislation that
demands greater transparency or some other form of oversight was,
perhaps, inevitable. 329
2. Addressing Fraud and Abuse
"Fraud," as many advocates of trust transparency use the term,
speaks more to social norms than criminal conduct. 330 While this
does not preclude the possibility that some claims are fraudulent in
the narrow legal sense, it captures a broader policy concern that the
approval of some of their ostensible adversaries-the lawyers that comprise the
TAC-before changing their criteria for paying claims, the values they assign to
claims, and their process for deciding which claims warrant more extensive
review. See id at 15-16, 22-23. And, of course, the TDPs at several trusts
contemplate the payment of claims advanced after applicable state law
limitations periods have run or trials have concluded with a determination that
the trust has no liability to a plaintiff, whereas these considerations would
obviously argue against settlement in the tort system. See id. at 17-18, 20-22.
324 See infra text accompanying notes 325-29.
325 See Brown, Without Compromise, supra note 17, at 897-902 (noting
that the process for appointing key fiduciaries in asbestos bankruptcies
unnecessarily creates conflicts of interest between their constituencies and the
repeat players who select these fiduciaries for these roles).
326 Id. at 919-21.
327 See McGovern, supra note 2, at 1725.
328 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 575 fig.1 (demonstrating that
trust assets are declining at a rapid rate); Scarcella & Kelso, supra note 113, at 3
(discussing the impact of these reductions on payments to victims).
329 See generally Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 584 (discussing the
need for transparency in order to allow more oversight of the trust system and
thereby prevent abuse).
330 See generally Lisa J. McIntyre, A Sociological Perspective on
Bankruptcy, 65 IND. L. J. 123, 124 (discussing bankruptcy law and its
connection to society and its norms).
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current gaps between the trust and tort systems allow claimants to
shape misleading "realities" in one or both to maximize
recovery. 3 3 ' It raises questions about the legitimacy of a system
that accepts and pays claims based on zealous characterizations of
the underlying facts that, upon reflection, do not mirror some
broader social norms concerning meritorious claims. 332 This
includes the potential that the omission of critical facts in one or
both systems, regardless of whether these omissions are intentional
or merely beneficial mistakes, will enable claimants to obtain
recoveries that would otherwise be unwarranted.333 And, given that
every such payment to parties asserting dubious claims represents
a reduction in assets that would otherwise go to victims whose
claims do not suffer from such deficiencies, the fraud argument
ultimately hinges on the inequity of paying specious claims today
at the expense of future victims. 334
By contrast, trust officials and plaintiffs' lawyers tend to focus
on fraud from a purely legal standpoint-whether they have
uncovered conduct that qualifies as civil or criminal fraud-when
331 See DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at 3 (explaining that it is
common for claimants to try and recover from more than one source).
332 See generally William P. Shelley et al., The Need for Transparency
Between the Tort System and Section 524(g) Asbestos Trusts, 17 NORTON J. OF
BANKR. L. & PRACTICE 257, 258 (2008), available at http://www.cozen.
com/admin/files/publications/JBLP_vi 7n2_ShelleyCohnArnoldsent%2004020
8.pdf (discussing how claimants have been using joint and several liability in a
way which holds defendants "liable for their entire reward," when their shares of
liability are only comparatively minor).
333 See id. (discussing defendants' inability to obtain information about
other claims being filed by plaintiffs, thereby "hampering their ability . .. to
obtain judgment reductions, credits, and/or offsets that they should in all fairness
receive").
334 Questions for the Record Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency
(FACT) Act of 2013: Hearing on H.R. 982 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust
Law, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of S. Todd Brown) [hereinafter Questions
for the Record by Brown] (stating that "past policy failures have impacted
current victims' prospects for recovery" and that "the ongoing rapid depletion of
trusts today suggests that the recovery prospects for future victims will be
worse").
20 13] 349
350 WIDENER LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 23
335discussing the issue. However, even this narrow argument
appears inconsistent with the experience of compensation funds
generally, 336 some bankruptcy trust representatives' concerns
regarding the claims submitted to the trusts,337 and the fact that
similar conduct has been found fraudulent elsewhere. 338
When these representations are viewed in light of what is
known about trust reviews and audits, however, the suggestion that
3 See generally Daniel Fisher, Law Firm Hit With $429,000 Verdict Over
Faked Asbestos Suits, FORBES (Dec. 12, 2012), http://www.forbes.com/sites/
danielfisher/2012/12/21 /law-firm-hit-with-429000-verdict-over-faked-asbestos-
suits/ (suggesting that lawyers for asbestos plaintiffs do not find claims
fraudulent when they believe there is a "reasonable basis" for the claim).
336 Jay Weaver, Fraud Pollutes BP Oil-Spill Compensation Fund for Gulf
Coast Victims from Florida to Louisiana, MIAMI HERALD (Aug. 19, 2012),
http://www.miamiherald.com/2012/08/19/2959468/fraud-pollutes-bp-oil-spill-
compensation.html (stating that "anytime you establish a very generous public
compensation program, it will trigger a certain amount of fraudulent activity");
see also DISASTER FRAUD TASK FORCE, REP. TO ATT'Y GEN. FOR FISCAL YEAR
2011 1 (2012) (stating that "in any disaster, there are always individuals who are
not entitled to that assistance, but who falsely claim those benefits for their
personal gain, often at the expense of the true victims of disasters"); Allen R.
Prunty & Mark E. Solomons, The Federal Black Lung Program: Its Evolution
and Current Issues, 91 W. VA. L. REv. 665, 734 (1989) (discussing fraud in the
black lung program).
13 Questions for the Record Furthering Asbestos Claim Transparency
(FACT) Act of 2013: Hearing on H.R. 982 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary and the Subcomm. on Regulatory Reform, Commercial & Antitrust
Law, 113th Cong. 6 (2013) (statement of Elihu Inselbuch) (explaining that not
all claims are accepted and some are rejected in order to prevent the payment of
fraudulent claims); 3 Asbestos Trusts Accuse Attorney of Submitting Fraudulent
Claim Information, 12:3 MEALEY'S ASBESTOS BANKR. REP. (Oct. 2012)
(asserting, in the first suit of its kind, that a law firm employed dubious patterns
and practices in submitting claims and seeking declaratory relief in response to
litigation threats from the firm).
338 See Fisher, supra note 335 (discussing a jury verdict against two
lawyers for fraud); John O'Brien, Federal Jury Finds Fraud on Part ofAsbestos
Lawyers, LEGAL NEWSLINE LEGAL J. (Mar. 10, 2010), http://legalnewsline.
com/news/226046-federal-jury-finds-fraud-on-part-of-asbestos-lawyers
(discussing a jury verdict finding Mississippi lawyers guilty of fraud for failing
to disclose plaintiffs' receipt of compensation in a previous settlement
administered by the lawyers).
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fraud has not been uncovered is understandable. 339 Discovering
fraud through individual claim review may be possible where the
submitter is careless or foolish, advancing claims that are
obviously fraudulent and lacking any colorable argument that it is
the product of a mistake. 340 But, legal fraud is rarely so cut-and-
dry, especially when there is little available information.34 1 In other
cases, the review process may simply conclude if the claim is
approved or the claimant does not respond to a deficiency
notice. 342 If the claim is audited, the risk of discovery depends
upon the nature and extent of the audit; not all "audits" are the
same.343 Indeed, although some trusts may have aggressive audit
plans that attempt to identify and deter abusive patterns and
practices, some report that they do not track the claim-level data
necessary to conduct stratified, targeted audits when questionable
practices or patterns may warrant such an approach.344
Not surprisingly, these discussions most often have a "two
ships passing in the night" quality, which the competing voices
339 See S. Todd Brown, Specious Claims and Global Settlement, 42 U.
MEM. L. REV. 559, 608-09 (2012).
340 See generally id. (explaining that only obviously fraudulent claims are
likely to be discovered).
341 See generally id. at 609-10 (explaining that it is often hard to determine
whether the specious claims are inadvertent or by design, thus they are likely to
go uninvestigated and undetected).
342 See generally id. at 613 n.194 (quoting In re Phenylpropanolamine
(PPA) Prods. Liab. Litig., 460 F.3d 1217, 1225 (9th Cir. 2006)) (explaining the
process through which a deficiency notice is sent, and how it can result in a
claim dismissal).
343 Id. at 619-20 (explaining that while auditing should be mandatory, there
is no "uniform model," and it will depend on things such as the likelihood of
future claim submissions).
344 See Supplemental Letter from Douglas A. Campbell to House
Subcommittee (Mar. 20, 2013) (acknowledging that the four trusts represented
by counsel do not currently track and compile the information required under the
FACT Act). As noted in connection with the 2013 hearings on the FACT Act,
these representations raise serious questions as to how the trusts could identify
abusive or fraudulent claiming patterns and practices. See Questions for the
Record by Brown, supra note 334, at 2.
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appear largely satisfied to perpetuate. 345 For defendants, fraud
continues a broader narrative that paints plaintiffs' lawyers in a
negative light, even where they are arguably doing no more than
utilizing the tools available to advance their clients' interests.346
For plaintiffs, this focus on fraud shifts the debate away from the
policy justifications for those tools to a narrow category of
conduct, of which the impact cannot be ascertained empirically.347
Thus, the remainder of this discussion focuses on the policy
arguments on their own terms, rather than further unpacking the
confusing and unduly inflammatory fraud characterization. 348
a. The Bankruptcy Policy Argument
From the bankruptcy perspective, the question is twofold: (1)
whether claims that lack intrinsic merit are being unduly paid, and
(2) the extent to which claims that have merit are nonetheless
receiving more than is equitable vis-a-vis similar current and future
claims.3 49 Both points require further discussion than space allows
in this article, but the main points can be readily identified.
345 See infra notes 346-47 and accompanying text (discussing plaintiffs'
and defendants' 'competing voices' on the issue of "fraud" as it relates to
plaintiffs seeking damages from trusts as well as companies in court).
346 See generally Tiffany Kary, Bogus Asbestos Claims Cheat Companies,
Lawyer Testifies, BLOOMBERG (Mar. 13, 2013, 5:37 PM), http://www.bloom
berg.com/news/2013-03-13/bodgus-asbestos-claims-cheat-companies-lawyer-
testifies.html (explaining defendants' concerns that "under the current system,
people claiming money from asbestos can seek damages from trusts . .. and
simultaneously sue non-bankrupt companies," allowing plaintiffs' lawyers to use
this system to maximize their clients' returns); Shelley et al., supra note 332, at
258 (explaining how claimants are using joint and several liability to recover
from multiple defendants); DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 3
(explaining that it is common for claimants to try and recover from more than
one source).
347 See infra note 358 and accompanying text (noting that policy questions
will be solved with the use of empirical data).
348 See generally Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 588, 592 (discussing
policy considerations of equal treatment for creditors, transparency, and plaintiff
privacy and explaining that public knowledge of fraud in the system leads to
"doubts about the trusts' credibility and quality controls").
349 See generally Daniel Fisher, Double-Dippers, FORBES (Aug. 19, 2006,
4:40 AM), http://www.forbes.com/forbes/2006/0904/136.html (noting that a
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The intrinsic merit question appears simple at first glance, but
its answer ultimately relies upon a complex normative assessment
of what makes a claim meritorious. 35 0 Is the tort system the gold
standard, and if so, at what point? Should claims be deemed
compensable merely because they might survive summary
judgment, or should the inquiry focus on whether they would
prevail at trial? Even if we accept one approach over the other,
what about claims where the outcome in the tort system would
likely vary from one state to the next? Do we consistently go with
the lowest standard, the highest, or somewhere in between; or
should compensability in the trust system vary according to the
standard applicable to a specific claim? What role should the high
likelihood of settlement and the need to control administrative
costs play in shaping the standards?
In a perfect world, these and other policy questions would be
explored in detail as part of the political process, but, of course,
their resolution has been left largely to the bankruptcy process.351
This process strongly favors current claimants above future
victims, notwithstanding statutory language to the contrary. 352
Barring extensive changes to the process, and regular oversight to
ensure that these changes are achieving the desired ends, this
process is likely to favor current claimants in the future. 353
Accordingly, to obtain confirmation, the resulting trust
distribution procedures must appeal both to those advancing
common problem in this context is that trusts are paying money "based on
inflated or downright false" claims).
350 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 548 (explaining that claims are
assessed based on aggregate liability and seldom based on the merit of
individual claims); GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 19 fig.5 (showing the
process and analysis of an asbestos trust claim and demonstrating that it is a
complicated one with many intermediary steps).
35 See generally In re Fed.-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 362 (3d Cir.
2012) (showing that the trust system places authority in private rather than
public hands and suggesting that resolving these policy questions should be left
to Congress).
352 See generally id at 361 (noting current asbestos claims are given
preferential treatment over future claims).
3 See generally GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 18 (explaining that
"claims are paid according to a first-in, first-out (FIFO) rule, processing each
claim based on the date the claim was filed").
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weaker claims (who will prefer more inclusive standards) and
stronger, higher value claims (who will demand that the process
match or exceed their expectations in the tort system).354 Thus, we
should not be surprised when trust criteria and payment levels that
are satisfactory to current claimants at confirmation prove
unsustainable and ultimately require reductions in payments to
future victims. 3 55 In sum, each trust so established suffers from the
commons problem precisely because the process ultimately
empowers current claimants' to elevate their own individual self-
interests ahead of future victims. 356
I have suggested elsewhere that transparency should promote
internal trust reforms that better protect future victims' interests; 357
and, although I remain confident in this assessment, its immediate
value lies in the extent to which these policy questions can be
addressed empirically. 358 Understanding not only how trust
procedures are designed, but also how they are applied in practice,
is a necessary step in identifying where they are inconsistent with
broader norms about merit. 359 Likewise, developing a better
understanding of how differences across the trusts have impacted
claim submissions and payments should improve future claim
projections and inform the development of cost-effective
mechanisms that better capture these norms.360
354 See generally supra note 13 and accompanying text (explaining
requirements for confirmation of a bankruptcy trust under section 524(g) of the
Bankruptcy Code).
355 See generally Busting the Trust Fraud: Ohio Cleans up the Bar's
Asbestos Bankruptcy Scam, WALL ST. J., (Dec. 11, 2012), http://online.wsj.
com/news/articles/SB10001424127887324640104578161472087716126
(explaining how reform will protect bankruptcy trusts' funds for legitimate
future claims).
356See supra notes 12-16 and accompanying text; McGovern, supra note 2,
at 1722.
3 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 584 (noting that preventing abuse
is a critical component of the reforms).
358 See id (noting that there is limited empirical data available to evaluate
the policy questions implicated in bankruptcy trusts).
359 See generally id. at 560, 566, 568 (discussing the comparative analysis
of trust criteria, comparing exposure standards, medical criteria, audits and
adaptability of bankruptcy trusts).
360 See id at 584 (noting that "no one person or organization currently has
access to sufficient information across trusts to provide any meaningful
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b. The Tort Compensation Policy Argument
As with the state level legislation, the FACT Act arguably
would balance exposure and compensation linkages by providing
defendants with access to trust claim forms, materials, and
ultimately payment information. 36 1 Rather than revisit the impact
of this information on such linkages, the following focuses on the
manner in which this information may discourage strategic
nondisclosure and trust submission timing.362
First, in making this information available in the aggregate
and removing some of the hurdles erected by the trusts to access to
this information, the FACT Act should remove any perceived
363option for hiding the ball concerning trust exposures. Of course,
defense counsel must remain vigilant and ultimately use this
information to investigate and develop admissible evidence; the
FACT Act does not purport to alter state rules concerning
relevance or admissibility at trial.364
Although the FACT Act does not require claimants to advance
trust claims prior to trial,365 it may nonetheless discourage strategic
timing of trust submissions. 366 Regardless of when trust
submissions and payments occur, the risk that vigilant defendants
empirical assessment of the extent to which fraudulent claims are, or are not,
prevalent in the bankruptcy trust system").
361 H.R. 4369, 112th Cong. (2012).
362 Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 586-87 (noting that the FACT Act
requires information regarding plaintiffs claim be exposed, but also noting that
there is some limitation as to confidential information, including medical
records and social security numbers).
363 See Andrew Silverman, Furthering Asbestos Claims Transparency Act:
Discovery of Bankruptcy Claim Information to Avoid Double Compensation,
DEF. LITIG. INSIDER (July 9, 2013), http://www.defenselitigationinsider.
com/2013/07/09/furthering-asbestos-claims-transparency-act-discovery-of-
bankruptcy-claim-information-to-avoid-double-compensation/ (discussing that it
is important to have access to this information, because defendants often conceal
these claims to get a second recovery).
3 Id. See generally H.R. 4369 § 1 (showing that there is no language in
the Act indicating a change in state rules in evidence relevance or admissibility).
365 See generally H.R. 4369 § 2(8)(A)(i) (noting that under the Act, one
must disclose claims filed and amount paid out).
366 See supra note 363 and accompanying text (arguing that the FACT Act
should discourage strategically planned claim filings).
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may learn of after-the-fact filings suggests that those who play fast
and loose with trust exposures and payments in litigation and
settlement will face long-term credibility problems with defendants
and judges going forward.367 Conversely, these disclosures should
reward those who are already diligent in communicating with co-
counsel, who submit trust claims and freely share this information
with defendants today by providing a ready means of verifying that
they are, in fact, transparent in these discussions.36 8
However, for those who view settlement as the preferred or
only endgame in civil litigation, the FACT Act may be undesirable
in some circumstances.36 This is because the plaintiffs ability to
conceal trust payments may encourage plaintiffs and defendants to
settle.370 Plaintiffs, for example, knowing that they have received
substantial trust payments, may want to settle because the potential
upside at trial is low. 37 1 At the same time, defendants, who are
unaware that these payments have been substantial, may perceive
the risk at trial as considerably higher than it would be after verdict
molding to account for these settlements.372 Yet, in states that
require plaintiffs to file all trust claims seventy-five or ninety days
before trial, it is possible that one or more claims will be paid and
reported publicly while pretrial negotiations are ongoing. 373 Even
367 See generally H.R. 982, 113th Cong. § 2(8)(A)(i) (2013) (requiring
quarterly public reporting of certain information related to trust claims). Because
this information would become public, defendants and judges involved in
asbestos litigation will be able to learn of trust claims settlements and payments.
See id.
368 See id. § 2(8)(A)-(B) (stating that reporting under the FACT Act is
mandatory which would, in turn, verify any disclosure freely provided).
369 See generally Deborah R. Hensler, Asbestos Litigation in the United
States: Triumph and Failure of the Civil Justice System, 12 CONN. INS. L.J. 255,
262 .(noting that some judges focus on settlement because, "[fjrom a judicial
perspective, . . . settlements [have] the virtue of clearing hundreds of thousands
of cases from the court calendar in one fell swoop").
370 ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 61 (noting that a defendant's
lack of knowledge could lead to settlement).
3n See generally id. at 142 (noting that not all claims have a high value).
372 See Mendizabal, supra note 160, at 38 (noting that a lack of claim
transparency increases the financial burden on asbestos defendants).
3 Compare OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 2307.953(A)(1) (LexisNexis 2013)
(requiring that trust claims be filed seventy-five days before trial), with OKLA.
STAT. tit. 76, § 83 (2013) (requiring that trust claims be filed ninety days before
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in states without such requirements, 374 defendants can develop
information about specific plaintiffs' firms' settlement histories that
reflect their trust claim submission and payment patterns, which
are more accurate than relying upon assumptions about these
practices, as they largely must do today.37 5
Assume, for example, that a plaintiff has received $1 million
from the trust system (including an $800,000 payment after
individual review at a newly-established trust) and another
$500,000 from solvent defendants in a case that is factually similar
to other cases, where the plaintiffs' injuries were valued at between
$900,000 and $2 million. The plaintiffs lawyer may thus view that
the range of likely additional recovery at trial would be between $0
and $500,000, after any offset for these payments, and that any
verdicts that fall within the larger portion of this range ($900,000
to $1.5 million) will lead to no additional recovery after the time
and expense of trial. Thus, the plaintiffs likely maximum recovery
after trial would be $500,000 minus the anticipated costs of trial,
and one would expect a compensation-maximizing plaintiff to
accept settlements that approach or exceed that amount.
At the same time, the defendant does not know that trust
payments have been higher than the $300,000 that the plaintiffs
lawyer normally receives for similar claims in the trust system and
correctly estimates, given what is known about the settling co-
defendants' settlement patterns, that his or her settlements are
roughly $500,000. Thus, the defendant may reasonably estimate
that the potential downside at trial ranges from $100,000 to $1.2
million with, of course, the potential that it will prevail on one of
trial). One can see from these statutes that because each requires early disclosure
of trust claims, there is a potential for overlap between disclosure and pretrial
negotiations.
374 See ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 34 ("[Plaintiffs] sit on
the trust forms until after the civil case has settled or gone to verdict. And they
are permitted to do so under the rules in most jurisdictions."). See generally
Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 586 (noting that other states are considering
similar disclosure legislation).
3 Compare GAO REPORT, supra note 10, at 28 (noting that trusts may
exclude payment information, even when subpoenaed), with H.R. 982, 113th
Cong. § 2(8)(B) (2013) (requiring trusts to produce payment information upon a
defendant's request).
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its other defenses, bringing the upside to zero additional liability.
If the plaintiff suggests a willingness to accept a $400,000
settlement, then the defendant may view this offer as economically
reasonable, especially if the costs of defending the case further are
perceived as high.376
However, if both sides are aware of the actual existing
settlement values, the plaintiff may be willing to settle the claim at
$400,000, but the defendant may view the risk at trial as
acceptable.377 Now, the potential downside, exclusive of defense
costs, is not $800,000, it is only $100,000. Depending on the
defendants' assessment of the strengths and weaknesses of any
available defenses, it may only accept a much lower settlement or
prefer to roll the dice at trial, rather than set a precedent for future
settlements. Thus, by precluding the plaintiff from enjoying the
benefit of information asymmetries concerning his or her
extraordinary trust settlement, the FACT Act may, in this case,
undermine settlement talks.378
This scenario assumes several facts that, of course, are
unlikely to be true across cases. Information asymmetries
concerning trust claim payments will not always be sufficient to
alter the parties' respective settlement postures, especially where a
plaintiffs trust exposures are already known to the defendant, and
the claims are all paid at the trusts' respective scheduled values.379
Unknown co-defendant settlement amounts may also far exceed
376 See generally ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 61 (noting that
a defendant's lack of knowledge regarding its trial risk can be used as leverage to
force a defendant to settle).
377 See generally id. (noting that if a plaintiffs trust claim settlement
information is made available to the defendant, the defendant can better decide
whether to settle or bring the case to trial).
378 Id. (noting that a defendant with access to a plaintiffs trust claim
information may think that its potential for loss is low, and, therefore, go to
trial).
3 See generally Karen Marshall, 3 Things Mesothelioma Plaintifs Should
Know about Defendant, ASBESTOS.COM (June 1, 2012), http://www.asbestos.
com/blog/2012/06/01/3-things-mesothelioma-plaintiffs-should-know/ (listing
other factors considered by defendants when deciding whether to settle, such as
admissions of liability, jury outcomes, and the possibility of additional lawsuits).
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any payments from the trusts.380 Moreover, it may work the other
way as a defendant may not believe that a plaintiffs likely trust
payments are as low as they ultimately prove to be; in this
scenario, the defendant incorrectly underestimates the risk at trial
and proceeds to litigate a claim that it would have settled in a
world of perfect knowledge. 38 1 And, of course, some defendants
may continue to insist upon going to trial, even in cases where
settlement appears rational.382
3. The Privacy Question
Another common critique of the FACT Act is that it "would
require the trusts to publicly disclose extensive, individual and
personal claim information." 383 A similar criticism suggests that
the act "could further victimize unsuspecting asbestos victims by
requiring information about their illness to be made publically
available to anyone who has access to the Internet" 384 and,
accordingly, this information could "be used by data collectors and
other entities for purposes that have absolutely nothing to do with
compensation for asbestos exposure."385
These characterizations of the federal legislation, however
forceful, do not present accurate portrayals of its terms or the
manner in which it would operate within the bankruptcy system. 386
380 See generally H.R. 982 § 2(8)(A)(i) (showing that the reporting
requirements of the FACT Act only apply to trust settlements; thus, information
relating to a plaintiffs settlement with another defendant may be unknown to the
defendant in the current litigation).
381 See generally Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 548 (noting that
settlement history "may over or understate the debtor's legal liability to asbestos
personal injury claimants").
382 See generally id at 549 (noting that defendants may elect to litigate a
case even where settlement appears to be the economically rational course).
383 Andrew Cochran, Why Would We Dishonor Veterans' Injury Claims
and Invade Their Privacy, MADISON COUNTY REC. (May 23, 2013),
http://7thamendmentadvocate.org/blog/2013/05/why-would-we-dishonor-
veterans-injury-claims-invade-their-privacy/.
384 FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 31 (dissenting views).
381 Id. at 32.
386 See infra note 438 and accompanying text (explaining that it is too early
to determine the effect of this legislation and how it addresses the perceived
abuses in the bankruptcy context).
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First, the information required in such reports is no more than is
already required with respect to creditors, including tort creditors,
in a proof of claim or on a debtor's schedule. 38 7 The personal
information to be disclosed under the act-name and nature of the
injury asserted-is far from "extensive;" 388 rather, it is the sort of
information that is already available concerning litigants on public
dockets in state court and, at times, on the Internet. 3 This
information has been disclosed in the past in bankruptcy cases, 390
and there have been no reports of such abuse, with respect to the
trust that already discloses all of the information required under the
FACT Act. 39 1
Second, although it is true that the legislation would require
trusts to file quarterly reports on the public docket in bankruptcy
cases, this does not create any serious risk of intrusion.392 Contrary
to the suggestion above, the dockets for these closed cases are not
typically available on the Internet. 393 Moreover, courts frequently
modify or limit access to files that contain personal information by
issuing protective orders and screening those seeking access,394
387 Brown, Forever,supra note 13, at 588-89.
388 FACT ACT REPORT, supra note 29, at 32 (dissenting views)
(acknowledging that what would be released would include names and exposure
histories). Consistent with the limitations on identifying information found in
Bankruptcy Rule 9037(a), the FACT Act expressly precludes the disclosure of
social security numbers. Id. at 14.
389 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 588 (discussing how under the
FACT Act, information about asbestos victims is made publically available to
those who access the Internet).
390 Id. at 589.
391 id
392 See id at 588 (stating that it is possible to protect claimant's information
on the Internet without completely shielding information concerning the claim).
3 Id. at 589 (noting that documents on the dockets in closed cases,
including asbestos bankruptcy cases, are no longer available on the Internet and
that courts can modify access in order to avoid misuse).
394 See, e.g., In re Kaiser Aluminum Corp., 327 B.R. 554, 560 (Bankr. D.
Del. 2005) (holding that the bankruptcy court acted appropriately in limiting
electronic access to Bankruptcy Rule 2019 disclosures).
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and nothing in the FACT Act forecloses this option with respect to
the trusts' reports. 395
V. THE COMMONS PROBLEM REVISITED: A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE
ON THE TRUST AND TORT SYSTEMS
In asbestos personal injury litigation, the commons problem
captures the potential that the parties' private self-interests will
generate unsustainable compensation burdens on a given defendant
or trust.396 From a systemic standpoint, the commons problem also
reflects the long-term risk that asbestos litigation will be
unsustainable across defendants, leading to the establishment of
more underfunded trusts and leaving only less viable sources of
compensation in the tort system. 397 This section discusses the
commons problem as a matter of local (individual defendants), and
systemic (across defendants and trusts) asset depletion and
compensation scarcity.
A. The Local Impact ofBankruptcy Trusts
If we view each defendant company as a distinct commons, its
bankruptcy is a form of coercion that alters each plaintiffs access
to the shared resource.398 Initially, the automatic stay in bankruptcy
erects an absolute barrier to access, suspending the plaintiffs
395 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 588-89 (explaining that there are
ways to protect a claimant by limiting access to other information, even if details
about claimant's illness are exposed by the FACT Act).
396 See supra notes 355-56 and accompanying text (noting that the
commons problem encourages current claimants to pursue their own individual
self-interest and file claims which, in turn, results in reductions in compensation
to future victims).
397 See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text (discussing how
increasing the potential recovery for clients in turn overgrazes trusts, which are
severely underfunded for future victims, making their only remedy the tort
system).
398 See generally infra notes 425, 434 and accompanying text (discussing
how limited compensation from trusts has led to a decline in shared resources
for each plaintiff).
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ability to proceed against the debtor for recovery.399 Yet, section
524(g) ensures that the power to design post-bankruptcy rules
governing access to the resource will be placed largely at the
discretion of the same plaintiffs and defendants whose perceived
self-interests made litigation and settlement in the tort system
unsustainable. 400 These bankruptcy negotiations involve promises
of future trust payments that most often accelerate overexploitation
and ensure that the combined effect of individual demands against
the trust will generate greater, rather than less, strain on its
resources and accelerate its depletion. 40 1
With respect to claim qualification and valuation, the trusts
established under section 524(g) encourage the advancement of
individual self-interests ahead of collective, long-term interests.402
Trusts pay claims faster, employ weaker compensation standards
than the tort system, and frequently lack robust, comprehensive
quality controls.403 Current plaintiffs with weaker claims may thus
399 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (2012). The automatic stay does not, of course,
extend to related cases against co-defendants. Arnold v. Garlock, Inc., 278 F.3d
426, 436 (5th Cir. 2001).
400 See tit. 11, § 524(g)(2)(B) (showing that under section 524(g), trust
criteria are proposed by those same defendants and must be approved "by at
least 75 percent of those [victims]" in every given case). Asbestos litigation, for
example, has proved so onerous on the tort system that "[j]udges, lawyers, and
legislators all share a belief that asbestos litigation is a national tragedy-a
tragedy for victims and defendants alike-which deserves a national statutory
solution." Francis E. McGovern, Asbestos Legislation II: Section 524(g) Without
Bankruptcy, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 233, 233 (2003) (footnotes omitted); see supra
note 355 and accompanying text (discussing how claimants driven by self-
interest have depleted the compensation and resulted in payment reductions for
future victims, making it unsustainable).
401 See, e.g., In re Global Indus. Techs., 645 F.3d 201, 214 (3d Cir. 2011)
(noting that the establishment of a silica bankruptcy trust triggered an "explosion
of new claims" where the trust recognized "4,600 silica-related claims, as
opposed to a pre-Plan world that recognized only 169").
402 See generally Plevin, et al., supra note 17, at 914-15 (citing tit. 11,
§ 524(g)(2)(B)(ii)(IV)(bb)) (noting that some present claimants "enjoy the
benefit of a far less stringent evaluation to determine entitlement to
compensation ... [in order] to induce them to vote in favor of the pre-packaged
plan in large enough numbers to meet the 75% 'supermajority' requirement in
section 524(g)").
403 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 559-73 (discussing quality
controls of bankruptcy trusts).
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benefit by obtaining compensation from a trust, where their claims
404
would not have been viable in the tort system. Plaintiffs with
asymptomatic injuries may benefit as well, particularly where their
claims are on suspended dockets or are otherwise not likely to
result in compensation in the tort system. 405 In the short term, even
victims with strong claims may benefit by submitting claims for
individual review and receiving prompt payments that meet or
exceed the amounts they would have received from the trust's
predecessor in the tort system.406
Over time, however, trusts overrun by high claim volumes and
aggregate payments most often pay smaller and smaller portions of
the reorganized debtors' former liability shares, with some trusts
paying less than one percent of the agreed value of settled
claims.407 Others may suspend payments for extended periods to
preserve assets.408 Trusts may not be intended to carry only a
fraction of the liability share that their predecessors carried in the
tort system, but they most often do so within a few years.409
Today's plaintiffs are thus able to enjoy the full benefit of each
claim they file across trusts and in the tort system, with the impact
of any overgrazing shifted to future victims. 4 10
404 See id. at 559 (explaining that the negotiated "trust criteria expand the
pool of compensable claims beyond comparable standards in the tort system").
405 See Fisher, supra note 349 ("Even as states crack down on frivolous
[tort] lawsuits by people with no symptoms at all, trusts established by bankrupt
asbestos manufacturers are paying tens of thousands of claims each year based
on inflated or downright false stories of how people were exposed to their
products.").
406 One reason for this increased compensation in trust cases is that parties
avoid the high transaction costs associated with traditional tort litigation. See
supra Part IV.B.2.b. "In addition, some claimants who qualify for expedited
review may nonetheless request individual review in hopes of obtaining more
compensation for their injuries than provided by the scheduled value for their
respective injuries." Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 554.
407 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at app.A (listing payment
percentages across trusts).
408 See supra text accompanying notes 113-16.
409 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 574-78 (discussing trust assets
and payment percentages).
410 See id. at 539-40.
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B. From Local to Systemic Depletion
The commons framework is useful for understanding the
implications of both the current state of affairs in asbestos
litigation and the potential impact of different tort and trust
reforms. 4 11 The rapid depletion of several trusts has clear and
disturbing implications for those for whom the trusts will be the
best, if not only, practical means of compensation in the future.4 12
It also demonstrates that the past and future transformation of
claims against solvent defendants into claims against underfunded
trusts has broader, global implications. 413 Due to the linkages
among them, the rapid depletion of one commons will create still
more pressure on others.414 And, given the projected duration of
asbestos litigation in the United States, 415 this suggests that we will
not only see more defendant bankruptcies, but also a period of
expanded and accelerated scarcity for plaintiffs seeking
compensation.416
The prospects for compensation when these defendants and
trusts prove unsustainable hinge, then, upon three factors: (1)
whether demand for compensation will decline to match their
resources; (2) the extent to which existing linkages will effectively
411 See generally McGovern, supra note 2, at 1721-24 (stressing the
importance of understanding the forces behind the "commons" problem in order
to address the "tragedy" that is asbestos litigation).
412 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 593.
413 One effect is companies that are usually "reluctant to file for
bankruptcy ... until their assets have been [greatly] diminished" will do so
sooner because "it is possible to pre-negotiate a plan of
reorganization ... knowing in advance what the [more speedy] outcome will be"
under section 524(g). See McGovern, supra note 400, at 246.
414 See supra text accompanying notes 42-44.
415 One study estimates that 600,000 asbestos claimants have come forward
through 2000, and another 1 to 3 million will do so in the future. STEPHEN J.
CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION COSTS AND COMPENSATION: AN
INTERIM REPORT 77-78 (2002), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/
rand/pubs/documented briefings/2005/DB397.pdf. Although this study was
conducted prior to the mid-2000s decline in nonmalignant filings, this impact of
this decline appears to have been largely offset by an increase in lung cancer
cases and other client recruiting practices. See Scarcella et al., supra note 103,
at 15-17.
416 See supra text and accompanying notes 407-10.
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allow those experiencing scarcity to pursue offsetting
compensation elsewhere; and (3) the extent to which victims are
ultimately able to obtain this offsetting compensation from these
417other sources.
1. Current and Future Demands for Compensation
Asbestos use in the United States peaked at over 136,000
metric tons in 1973 and declined gradually over the next two
decades. 4 18 This consumption has fluctuated between 869 and
1,180 metric tons since 2009, with roughly 98% of this use in the
chlor-alkali industry (where a cost-effective alternative to asbestos
remains elusive) and the roofing industry, and is expected to
remain in the 1,000 metric ton range going forward.4 19 Some of the
industries most associated with asbestos litigation historically-
including the insulation, cement, and flooring products industries-
effectively transitioned away from asbestos in the 1980s or early
1990s; while other industries, including the friction products and
packing and gaskets industries, saw at least marginal asbestos use
through the early 2000s.420
The most recent projections, however, indicate that asbestos
injuries in the United States will remain above background levels
for another four decades, with most of these occurring in the next
decade. 42 1 Thus, asbestos litigation will likely remain a pervasive
417 See generally McGovern, supra note 2, at 1721-26 (viewing the entire
universe of asbestos litigation as a commons problem epitomized by an ever-
increasing number of plaintiffs scrambling for their share of a limited resource,
whereby each plaintiffs effort to recover from all possible defendants results in
a further depletion of the "common" pool of assets). "In the context of asbestos,
if there is a limited fund of money for asbestos plaintiffs and no restriction on
their access to that fund, it will become dissipated before all the asbestos
plaintiffs are paid. [T]he latecomers will suffer." Id. at 1722 n.5.
418 ROBERT L. VIRTA, WORLDWIDE ASBESTOS SUPPLY AND CONSUMPTION
TRENDS FROM 1900 THROUGH 2003 29-30 (2006), available at http://pubs.
usgs.gov/circ/2006/1298/.
419 U.S. GEOLOGICAL SURVEY, MINERAL COMMODITY SUMMARIES 2013 22
(2013), available at http://minerals.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/mcs/2013/mcs2O13.
pdf.
420 See VIRTA, supra note 418, at 31 tbl.3.
421 Judicial Education Program Transcript, supra note 7, at 492 (providing
the remarks of Mark Behrens).
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presence in the civil justice system, as long as most of today's
judges remain on the bench.422
2. Imbalanced Linkages, Reform, and the Acceleration of
Scarcity
Seventeen companies, representing as much as two-thirds of
the original liability share in asbestos litigation, entered bankruptcy
423
by 1993. As noted previously, that number has grown to roughly
100 companies today, and "the major producers of asbestos have
virtually all been forced into bankruptcy." 424 These departures
from the tort system, and the poor prospects of recovery from the
resulting trusts, represent a substantial decline in the resources
available for compensation for current and future victims. 425
Of course, the tort system accounts for the potential
bankruptcy of one or more co-defendants.426 In some states, that
risk is borne by the plaintiff; in others, defendants must make up
any deficiency. 427 Still, others transfer unpaid bankrupt liability
shares only to those defendants who are at fault above a certain
threshold. 4 28 And, though we may expect the wisdom of these
policies will be called into question and debated elsewhere, they
are only at issue in the transparency debates to the extent that the
422 id.
423 Ronald L. Motley & Joseph F. Rice, The Carlough Settlement-
Blueprint for a Sane Resolution to the Asbestos Problem, 8:11 MEALEY'S LITIG.
REP.: ASBESTOS 4 (July 2, 1993) ("All in all, seventeen (17) former asbestos
defendants-representing one-half to three-quarters of the original liability share-
have gone into bankruptcy.").
424 Judicial Education Program Transcript, supra note 7, at 493 (providing
the remarks of Mark Behrens).
425 See generally Behrens, supra note 7, at 503 n.7 (discussing attorneys
seeking out new defendants to compensate clients since traditional asbestos
makers and users have been depleted due to bankruptcy litigations). See also id.
at 505 n.14 (discussing lack of money available to those harmed because of the
reduction in "traditional defendants").
426 See DIXoN & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xi.
427 See id. at xii-xiii (discussing different degrees of defendant liability
used in various states).
428 See Shelley et al., supra note 332, at 265-66 (discussing states barring
joint and several liability and having defendants only pay liability assigned to
them or barring defendants under fifty percent liable from joint and several
liability).
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opaque nature of the current system may surreptitiously alter their
effect across cases.429
Although plaintiffs may be able to enhance their individual
recoveries where the linkages are imbalanced, they also accelerate
the depletion of the applicable trusts and the sustainability of
solvent defendants.430 Collectively, the potential impact on juries'
assessments of causation and allocation of liability, and,
accordingly, the defendant's risk assessments in settlement
discussions, may transform a defendant's short-term and long-term
liability exposure considerably. 43 1 For some, the additional burden
may be unsustainable, leaving them with far more demands for
compensation than they can satisfy and, ultimately, driving them
into bankruptcy. 432
By that same token, however, there is always the danger that
efforts to reform the system will deny plaintiffs any reasonable
prospect of recovery from solvent defendants who, upon full
consideration of the relevant facts, should be held accountable
under applicable substantive law. 433 In that case, compensation
rights are limited, not because the available resources are overrun,
429 Id. at 264-65, 272-73 (discussing lack of transparency and the ability to
correctly decide the appropriate percentage of liability to assign to a defendant).430 See DIXON & McGOVERN, supra note 42, at xi.
431 See generally Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 579-81 (discussing the
trend of defendants refusing to enter into large global settlements unless future
claims are included into the trust).
432 See generally Shelley et al., supra note 332, at 265 (discussing the fact
that most original asbestos defendants have been driven into bankruptcy because
of the unjust results from joint and several liability in asbestos litigation); The
Public Policy Solution To Runaway Asbestos Litigation, 12:1 ISSUE
BACKGROUNDER 1-2 (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.paint.org/component/
docman/catview/53-backgrounder.html (discussing the asbestos litigation
epidemic and its enormous transactional costs to asbestos companies which are
driven into bankruptcy).
433 ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 119-20 (discussing results of
tort reform and the dismissal of ninety percent of pending cases, as well as the
shift in liability it creates). See generally ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note
107, at 89-90 (discussing the shift in liability allowing asbestos companies to
avoid liability while others must pay the bill).
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but because the civil justice system effectively closes its doors.434
As noted previously, this is arguably the fate of asymptomatic
claims in some jurisdictions; including claims that, but for deferred
docket and similar mechanisms, would be compensable in the tort
system.435
The various transparency proposals advanced to date, 436
however, do not appear likely to have such a dramatic effect on
tort claimants' rights. The federal legislation is narrow and should
have, at best, an indirect effect on litigation by unwinding some
existing information asymmetries. 437 And, though it remains too
early to assess the precise effect of the state legislation passed to
date, it appears that judges enjoy considerable discretion in
interpreting the legislation and addressing perceived abuses
otherwise. Future legislation that goes beyond the reach of the
Ohio and Oklahoma Acts, 439 however, may have far more
profound effects.
3. The Capacity for Compensation Going Forward
The third question for the purposes of understanding the
implications for plaintiff compensation is necessarily related to the
second: whether the additional liability carried by lead defendants
is sustainable and, if not, the extent to which the resulting trusts
434 See ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 120 (discussing that the
way the law is written in some states (i.e. Ohio) plaintiffs with asbestos related
diseases are unable to file claims).
435 See supra notes 403-05 and accompanying text.
436 See supra notes 87-89, 173-75, 305-15 and accompanying text.
437 See generally Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 584 (discussing how
transparency may allow the United States, courts and other parties to identify
and address some shortcomings).
438 See generally United States v. Owens Contracting Servs., Inc., 884
F.Supp. 1095, 1101 (E.D. Mich. 1994) (showing the court's interpretation of the
law contrary to the government's interpretation); Elsemore v. Grenell, No.
58267-4-1, 2007 Wash. App. LEXIS 2655, at *42-43 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 17,
2007) (showing that the court has discretion in interpreting the law); Man v.
Raymark Indus., 728 F.Supp. 1461, 1464 (D. Haw. 1989) (showing the court
interpreting federal law in opposition to the parties' interpretation).
439 See supra notes 206-09, 226-30 and accompanying text.
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and other solvent defendants will be able to fill the compensation
void.440
As an initial matter, it may be assumed that the sheer volume
of asbestos defendants may provide the ultimate check on global
compensation scarcity. 44 1 After all, of the roughly 10,000 entities
that have been named as defendantS442 during the first four decades
of this litigation, only 100 have entered bankruptcy. 4 These
numbers, combined with the plaintiffs' bar's historical success in
adapting to the changes within asbestos litigation generally,444 may
thus suggest that any risk of future compensation scarcity is
remote.
The raw numbers, however, may be misleading. Relatively
few defendants have been prominent repeat players over time, and
fewer still may be viable lead defendants across comparable
cases.445 And, if we assume that plaintiffs have been rational in
selecting defendants-naming those against whom they believe they
have the strongest potential of obtaining recovery-the demise of so
many former lead defendants suggests that the potential for
obtaining full recovery, at least in industries with few viable
440 See supra notes 431-32 and accompanying text.
441 Compare JENNI BIGGS ET AL., A SYNTHESIS OF ASBESTOS
DISCLOSURES: FROM FORM 10-KS 1 (2010), available at http://www.towers
watson.com/en-US/Insights/IC-Types/Survey-Research-Results/2010/04/A-
Synthesis-of-Asbestos-Disclosures-From-Form-10-Ks-2010, with supra note
424 and accompanying text. Considering only 100 companies in asbestos
litigation entered bankruptcy, this equates to 1% of the 10,000 companies in
asbestos litigation. Accordingly, since only 1% of the named defendants have
filed for bankruptcy, it suggests that the other 99% should be able to provide any
answers to the global compensation scarcity issue.
442 See BIGGS ET AL., supra note 441, at 1.
443 See supra note 424 and accompanying text.
444 See generally Bates, et al., Show Me The Money, 22:21 MEALEY'S
LITIG. REP.: ASBESTOS 1 (Dec. 3, 2007) (discussing the dramatic increase in the
average recovery from 2000 to 2007, thus, suggesting the plaintiffs' bar's
historical success in adapting to the changes within asbestos litigation).
445 See generally DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing
defendants' filing of bankruptcy and the formation of a bankruptcy trust that
allows plaintiffs to pursue multiple claims with what seems to be mediocre
results due to the defendants' lack of viability).
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corporate defendants, will diminish over time.446 As new lead
defendants become increasingly removed from the industry,447 we
may expect the prospects of obtaining high several liability
allocations and, in states with limited joint liability, satisfying the
necessary thresholds for requiring them to fill the compensation
void left by bankrupt defendants, to weaken even in the absence of
the proposed federal or state legislation. The remaining lead
defendants in some industries may lack sufficient resources to
carry increased liability shares over an extended period of time,
and others may rationally pursue bankruptcy early in the process to
reduce their estimated aggregate liability. 449
For this system to sustain plaintiffs' compensation demands,
then, plaintiffs must be able to obtain offsetting compensation from
other defendants in the tort system, or new trusts must consistently
come into the pipeline and follow the same model. 450 The two are,
of course, interrelated.451 If plaintiffs' evidence against solvent
defendants is insufficient to warrant a pattern of favorable
judgments at trial or demand high-value settlements, these
defendants are unlikely to pursue bankruptcy to address their
446 See generally McGovern, supra note 2, at 1722-23 (explaining the
inevitable diminishing recovery dollar value due to the "commons" problem in
asbestos litigation, even when the plaintiff acts rationally).
447 See generally STEPHEN J. CARROLL ET AL., ASBESTOS LITIGATION xxi
(2005), available at http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/monographs/
2005/RANDMG162.pdf (discussing the changing defendants in asbestos
litigation).
448 See generally ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 42-43, 131-33
(explaining the compensation void left by bankrupt defendants and how
legislation in Ohio will affect the plaintiff).
449 See id. at 44-45 (explaining how plaintiffs will be paid from a
bankruptcy trust in joint liability states).
450 See generally DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 30-31 (discussing
the provisions that will prevent plaintiffs from recovering more than their full
value of injuries and also explaining how trusts are now on the lookout for
plaintiffs attempting to do this, which, in turn, should allow for more plaintiffs
in the future to receive compensation).
451 See generally ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 46-47
(explaining how the trust and tort claim system is interrelated for a plaintiff).
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asbestos liabilities.452 If the linkages between the trusts and the tort
system are balanced only after numerous trusts have been depleted
and the remaining solvent defendants are far removed from the
asbestos industry, the compensation levels for future plaintiffs will
likewise equalize at a level that is far lower than if such steps are
taken sooner.453
Given that some appear to have compensable claims only
against established trusts today,454 the risk of global scarcity is not
academic; it is, for some, already a reality.4 55 Whether they worked
in professions that have already been depleted or past reforms
present insurmountable barriers to compensation for their
456
legitimate non-malignant injuries, scarcity played a role in
shaping how their claims are compensated today. 457 And, the
manner in which we address ongoing questions about the
bankruptcy trust and tort systems today will likewise play a
substantial role in determining how future victims are
compensated.
C. Implications for Policy Discussion
If we view asbestos compensation from a global perspective,
many of the arguments that drive the political debate today have
very little to tell us in shaping long-term policy. 4 58 Comparisons to
452 See generally DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at 2 (discussing the
fact that as expected future payments increase, many asbestos defendants filed
for bankruptcy).
453 See generally id. at xi (discussing that if the linkages problem is not
addressed, compensation levels for future plaintiffs will decrease based on
higher trust payments now).
454 See generally ABA June 5 Transcript, supra note 253, at 63 (explaining
that in Wisconsin, a lawyer had a number of claims that were only compensable
through the bankruptcy trust system).
455 See generally id. at 63 (providing a specific example of a Wisconsin
lawyer).
456 See generally id. at 70-71, 76-77 (discussing the availability of funds
for claims for non-malignant injuries and for different professions).
457 See In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042-43 (3d Cir. 1985)
(explaining how future claimants are considered in compensation claims today).
458 See generally ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 195-97
(explaining the significance of a long-term policy and how ensuing policy
recommendations have all failed).
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how the tort system manages litigant rights in cases with a discrete
universe of plaintiffs and little risk of compensation scarcity do
not, of course, capture the full array of competing interests when
scarcity is a concern.459 And, though it may be tempting to
disregard the potential for scarcity here, resources are often viewed
as inexhaustible until it is too late, and the preference for
advancing the wants and needs of today's population necessarily
shifts any risk of unsustainability to future generations.460
Defendants are clearly advancing their own interests with the
proposed legislation, but their points concerning plaintiff
exploitation of the gaps in the trust and tort systems have broader
implications. 461 As bankruptcies continue to mount and trust
payouts continue to exceed projections, the impact will be felt not
only by corporate stakeholders, but also future victims.462 To that
end, some form of enhanced oversight of the bankruptcy trusts and
enhanced measures at the state level to reduce gamesmanship may
serve the collective good even though it limits individual options
for maximizing compensation.4 6 3
Conversely, although plaintiffs' firms and groups present a
disturbing picture of the potential recoveries for some plaintiffs
464
today,46 the desire to maximize their recoveries conflicts with the
interests of similar future victims in ensuring that sufficient assets
459 See generally In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d at 1042-43 (explaining the
unique situation that asbestos plaintiffs face); ABA June 5 Transcript, supra
note 253, at 86-87 (explaining scarcity's role in the decision making of the
asbestos plaintiff).
460 See generally DIXON & MCGOVERN, supra note 42, at xi (discussing
"whether a lack of coordination between trusts and the tort system advantages
today's plaintiffs relative to future plaintiffs").
461 See id. (discussing a "lack of coordination between the trusts and the
tort system" which allows plaintiffs to recover under both the tort systems and
trusts).
462 See generally id. (discussing the rise in asbestos litigation compensation
payouts resulting in corporate bankruptcies).
463 See generally DIXON ET AL., supra note 144, at 2-3 (discussing state
level reforms implemented to manage mass tort asbestos claims).
46 See generally Ziffer, supra note 8 (discussing plaintiffs' substantial
recoveries for asbestos mass tort injuries).
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remain available to compensate them.465 This conflict is perhaps
best demonstrated by the degree to which choices that favored
victims in the past have impacted today's victims.4 66 In designing
the early bankruptcy trusts, litigants made the ill-fated decision to
adopt exceedingly low qualification standards that led to their
rapid depletion. 467 The power imbalance between current and
future victims became even more exaggerated under section
524(g), preserving this approach and encouraging more aggressive
front-loading in subsequent trusts. 4 68 Thus, notwithstanding the
inherent transaction cost advantage that trusts have over defendants
in the tort system-namely, replacing the high defense costs
associated with tort litigation with the low trust administration
costs 469 --this advantage appears to have been more than offset by
the resulting surge in claims received and paid. 470 And just as delay
may serve defendants' interests at trial, 47 1 delay in addressing
weaknesses in the trust system and its relationship with the tort
system favors current claimants and repeat players at the expense
of future victims. 472
465 In re Amatex Corp., 755 F.2d 1034, 1042-43 (3d Cir. 1985) (explaining
the conflict between current and future claimants). Similar concerns were also
expressed by the Supreme Court of the United States in its rejection of asbestos
class action settlements. Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999);
Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625-26 (1997).
466 See generally ABA June 6 Transcript, supra note 107, at 7 (discussing
the choice to follow a schedule to pay out claims to plaintiffs that, in retrospect,
should not have been paid out).
467 See generally supra Part IV.A (discussing the impact of trusts on
present and future asbestos claim litigants).
468 See In Re Fed.-Mogul Global Inc., 684 F.3d 355, 361 (3d Cir. 2012).
469 See id. at 362.
470 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 574-75 (discussing the rise of
bankruptcy trust payments).
471 See supra Part II.B.3 (stating that "[c]onventional wisdom is that delay
serves defendants' interests").
472 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 569-70 (explaining how "repeat
players will adopt patterns and practices , that exploit weaknesses in
comprehensive settlement[s]").
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VI. CONCLUSION
However understandable it may be for advocates and
participants to stress their individual interests when addressing the
proposed modifications to the trust and tort system discussed in
this article, the policy questions are ultimately global and
straightforward.473 From a procedural standpoint, is the process fair
and equitable to litigants, or does it merely promote gamesmanship
that distorts the truth-seeking function of litigation? As a matter of
compensation, does the proposal unduly limit victims' avenues for
recovery through delay and corruption of the tort process, or does
it merely capture the underlying principles of tort compensation?
As a matter of bankruptcy policy, will any federal legislation
promote accountability and equitable compensation for those
asserting similar claims, or will it merely advance the private self-
interests of solvent defendants? And, over time, are the practices
and rules in place today sufficient to protect the interests of future
victims?
To that end, this article has addressed the most common
allegations in these debates-complaints that fraud dominates
asbestos trust submissions and tort litigation, that trust officials are
part of some conspiracy to cheat solvent defendants of access to
the information they are entitled to receive under state law, and
that defendants are merely trying to avoid responsibility for the
injuries they caused 474 -largely as rhetorical distractions in a
broader, more significant policy discussion. 4 Some of the
arguments, including the suggestion that the proposals would lead
476to the public release of extensive and sensitive information, are
demonstrably overblown. Other arguments, including the
suggestion that fraud is rampant across trusts and the tort system,
cannot be verified empirically. 477 The privacy and fraud
arguments, however, advance their respective groups' interests by
stirring public outrage and, with respect to victims, fear that may
473 See supra Parts IV.A-B (discussing the global policy implications of
asbestos personal injury litigation).
474 See supra Parts II.B.1, III.B.2.
475 See supra Parts III.B.2.a-b (discussing policy arguments).
476 See Cochran, supra note 383.
477 See Brown, Forever, supra note 13, at 584.
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drive them to action; but, they ultimately do more to confuse the
policy discussion than advance it. 478
My purpose in laying bare the superficial nature of the talking
points that dominate this debate, however, is not to impugn the
integrity or motives of those advancing them. Such zealous
rhetoric is to be expected where passions built over more than four
decades of contentious litigation spill over into policy debates, and
both sides in these discussions advance broader, underlying policy
concerns that are reasonable. 479 Shaping policy to address these
complex questions, however, demands more careful and searching
reflection than the talking points suggest.
478 See supra Part III.B.2 (discussing fraud and abuse policy arguments).
479 See supra Part IV.C (discussing policy arguments).
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